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The Limits of Liability:
Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover
Pure Economic Loss?
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1987, the Glacier Bay, an American flag tanker,
sailed from Valdez, Alaska, bound for Nikiski, Alaska, carrying a
cargo of trans-Alaska pipeline crude oil. The next day the tanker
unexpectedly grounded while attempting to anchor in the Cook
Inlet. Sustaining severe damage to its hull, the Glacier Bay
discharged an estimated 150,000 gallons of crude oil into the
surrounding water.' On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran
aground in Prince William Sound after taking on a load of trans-
Alaska pipeline oil, spilling more than eleven million gallons of
crude oil into the water.' In January 1990, the supertanker Keystone
Canyon loaded a cargo of Alaska oil at the trans-Alaska pipeline
terminal at Valdez. Off the coast of California it transferred twenty-
four million gallons to the tanker American Trader. On February
7, while attempting to moor at its destination terminal, the American
Trader ruptured its hull by running over its anchor, causing 400,000
gallons of crude oil to spill into the ocean?
In addition to state and federal government actions against the
responsible parties, these incidents have sparked a complex series of
lawsuits by individual citizens seeking recovery for damages arising
from the spills.4 These plaintiffs include: commercial fishermen;
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1. In re the Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. Michele Straube, Is Full Compensation Possible for the Damages Resulting
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,338, 10,338 (1989).
3. Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 973 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1992).
4. Approximately 150 civil suits are currently pending as a result of the Exxon
Valdez spill. See Order No. 83 at 1, In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 Civil (D.
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owners of bait and tackle shops, marinas, and seafood restaurants;
and recreational users of the ocean. Recovery is sought for direct
physical damage to real and personal property caused by the oil, as
well as for pure economic loss in the form of lost business profits
resulting from the loss of use of the water resources.
Spills involving Alaska oil trigger competing state and federal
laws, making their resolution particularly complex. Oil spills are
maritime torts and are subject to the rights and remedies of federal
maritime law.5 Alaska oil is also governed by a comprehensive
federal statute drafted specifically to regulate oil transported
through the trans-Alaska pipeline system. Additionally, in the
exercise of its police power, the State of Alaska has enacted a
statute intended to punish those responsible for the discharge of
hazardous substances into state waters.7
Each legal scheme differs in its provisions regarding the type
and/or extent of recoverable damages. The general maritime law
prohibits recovery for pure economic loss - loss without any
connection to a physical injury to person or property.' The federal
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act ("TAPAA")9 enables
plaintiffs to recover in strict liability, up to a set limit, for "all
damages"1 ° arising from discharges of oil; yet in a glaring omission,
the statute does not specify whether the "all damages" phrase
includes pure economic loss. The Alaska statute provides for
unlimited strict liability for all damages, including pure economic
loss." Thus, the litigation over the recent spills of Alaska oil
implicates issues of federal statutory and maritime law, state
statutory law preemption, and statutory construction. In resolving
these cases, therefore, courts must determine: (1) whether and to
what extent Congress intended TAPAA to cover the field and
preempt the rights and remedies available under federal maritime
law and state statutory law; (2) if TAPAA does preempt the other
Alaska July 31, 1992) (order denying plaintiffs' motion to remand).
5. See infra part II.A.
6. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973,43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56
(1973) (amended 1990).
7. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.822-24 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
10. Id. § 1653(c)(1). The statute contains no definition of the term "all
damages." The proper scope of that term is an issue of contention in the current
litigation and is the subject of this paper.
11. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.824 (1991).
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legal schemes, how the term "all damages" in the statute should be
construed; and (3) whether state or general maritime law controls
in spills involving Alaska oil which exceed TAPAA's $100 million
strict liability limit. Although the Ninth Circuit and federal district
courts in Alaska and California have attempted to clarify these
issues, to date they have been unsuccessful.12
This note seeks to clarify the proper role of these three bodies
of law in litigation over Alaska oil spills. As a comprehensive
federal statute, TAPAA should preempt state law and federal
maritime law. However, because TAPAA was formulated against
the backdrop of established maritime law, it should be read to
incorporate within its "all damages" clause the general maritime rule
barring recovery for pure economic loss. Furthermore, for claims
exceeding TAPAA's $100 million strict liability limit, the general
maritime law should preempt state law and hence bar recovery for
economic loss unrelated to a physical injury to person or property.
Under these interpretations, therefore, all claims in the current
litigation seeking recovery for pure economic loss should be denied.
II. THE THREE BODIES OF LAW IMPLICATED
A. Federal Maritime Law - Maritime Jurisdiction and the Rule
of Robins Dry Dock
The jurisdiction of the federal courts over admiralty cases is
founded upon Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend... to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."' 3 The modem
statute governing admiralty jurisdiction grants original jurisdiction
to the federal courts over all civil cases cognizable in admiralty.4
12. See infra part fI.A.2., notes 118-137 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. The terms "admiralty" and "maritime law" are
used synonymously to describe "the set of legal rules, concepts, and processes that
relate to navigation and commerce by water." THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
ADMIRALTY AND MARrTmi LAW § 1-1 (1987).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1966). The statute provides that "the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of... [a]ny civil case
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled." Id. The "saving to suitors" clause does not
affect the application of maritime law:
[T]he "saving to suitors" clause allows state courts to entertain in personam
maritime causes of action, but in such cases the extent to which state law
may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called
"reverse-Erie" doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies
1993]
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In the absence of any prevailing federal statutory scheme, the
substantive law applicable to a maritime tort is the general maritime
law:
[W]hen a common law action is brought, whether in a state
court or in federal court, to enforce a cause of action cognizable
in admiralty, the substantive law to be applied is the same as
would be applied by an admiralty court - that is, the general
maritime law, as developed and declared, in the last analysis, by
the Supreme Court of the United States, or as modified from
time to time by act of Congress.15
Therefore, whether a claimant files a suit in state court, federal
court, or a federal court sitting in diversity, the same principles will
govern the outcome of the dispute.
To gain access to the maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the plaintiff's claim must first meet several threshold requirements
designed to ensure that the tortious act in question has some
connection to a traditional maritime activity. Historically, courts
determined the applicability of maritime jurisdiction through a
"locality" test that predicated maritime jurisdiction upon the situs of
the injury,6 thereby limiting jurisdiction to cases where the wrong
occurred on navigable waters.17  This test proved inadequate,
however, in determining proper jurisdiction in cases where it was
difficult to ascertain the precise situs of the injury. 8 In an attempt
to alleviate some of the confusion, Congress passed the Admiralty
afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime standards.
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-223 (1986).
15. Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212, 216 (1st Cir. 1950); see also
Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1989); In re the
Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. Alaska 1990).
16. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 3-4, at 69.
17. Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,340-41 (1973). The
threshold requirement for navigability is the existence of an "'interstate nexus:' the
waterbody in question must be available as a continuous highway for commerce
between ports and places in different states (or between a state and a foreign coun-
try)." SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 3-3, at 66.
18. See, e.g., T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928) (in a case
where the victim was hit and knocked into the water by the ship's sling while
standing on the dock, the court refused admiralty jurisdiction as the place of injury
was deemed the dock); The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935) (where the victim
was injured while disembarking from ship by falling from the gangplank onto the
dock, admiralty jurisdiction upheld as the place where the breach of duty occurred
was the gangplank and not the dock).
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Extension Act of 1948,19 extending federal admiralty jurisdiction to
all cases in which injuries or damages were caused by a vessel on
navigable water, including instances where the injuries were
consummated on land.' Ambiguous situations arose even under
this Act, and the courts were left to fashion the proper principles by
which they would accept or deny maritime jurisdiction.21
After some years, the Supreme Court grew weary of the
imprecision of the locality test and the way in which parties
manipulated it in order to be heard in admiralty. In Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, the Court rejected the pure
locality requirement in favor of a standard that looked to the
locality of the injury as well as to the existence of a "maritime
nexus."'  As asserted in Executive Jet, this two-part test requires
that the wrong must (1) "have occurred on the high seas or
19. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1975).
20. The Act provides that "[t]he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land." Id See Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1980) (the locality test is
satisfied if the alleged tortious activity caused damage to the water or marine
wildlife), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (admiralty
jurisdiction upheld where a longshoreman working on a dock unloading a ship
slipped on beaus from cargo that had been negligently stored and had spilled during
loading process); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971) (admiralty
jurisdiction denied where a longshoreman working on a dock was injured by
equipment owned and operated by the stevedore). The distinction between these
two cases was not related to the function the longshoremen were performing at the
time, but to the fact that, in Gutierrez, the "injury was caused by an appurtenance
of the ship, the defective cargo containers." Id at 210-11. This distinction remains
an important determinant, as "a ship or its appurtenances must proximately cause
an injury on shore to invoke the Admiralty Extension Act and the application of
maritime law." Pryor v. Am. President Lines, 520 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976).
22. 409 U.S. 249 (1972). This case involved the crash of an airplane into Lake
Erie shortly after taking off from the Cleveland airport. The court found no
relationship to traditional maritime activity and held that "there is no federal
admiralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims arising from flights by land-based
aircraft between points within the continental United States." Id at 274.
23. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 3-5, at 75.
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navigable waters"' and (2) bear a "significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."'  While the Executive Jet test in
practice "has not significantly reduced the scope of admiralty tort
jurisdiction or replaced the emphasis on locality and navigable
waters," it effectively serves as a "policy-based filter that allows the
courts flexibility in screening out unusual fact situations that are not
maritime in nature, but happen to occur in navigable waters. 2 6
The shipment of oil on tankers is an enterprise that bears a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Therefore,
oil spills that occur on navigable waters meet the Executive Jet test
and are maritime torts subject to the substantive maritime law.2
Through operation of the Admiralty Extension ActI injuries or
damages to land caused by oil spills that occur on navigable waters
are also governed by maritime law.29
One of the most significant features of maritime tort law is its
limitation on the types of loss for which plaintiffs can be compen-
sated. Under prevailing maritime law, "a plaintiff may not recover
24. See also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
863-64 (1986). Whether a particular body of water is navigable or not is a question
of fact, and the burden of proof rests with the party invoking admiralty jurisdiction.
Quick v. Hansen, 1975 Am. Mar. Cases 791, 792 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 976 (1975).
25. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268.
26. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 3-5, at 80.
27. See In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (holding that a shipwreck on the high seas causing an
extensive oil spill is "quintessentially the kind of incident for which the distinctive
doctrines and remedies of admiralty law were designed"); United States v. M/V Big
Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983) (holding
that an oil spill resulting from collision between ships on navigable waters is a
maritime tort); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327,334 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
that negligent conduct, such as the discharge of oil into navigable waters, which
causes loss to others, "constitutes a traditional maritime tort"); Puerto Rico v. S.S.
Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 672 (1st Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)
("An oil spill on the navigable waters is a breach of federal maritime law.").
28. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29. See Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d at 913 (Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act
covers damage to land caused by an oil spill); Louisiana ex reL Guste v. MIV
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903
(1986) (under the Admiralty Extension Act, admiralty jurisdiction extends to claims
for shoreside damages resulting from a chemical spill caused by the collision of
ships on a navigable waterway).
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for his economic loss resulting from bodily harm to another or from
physical damage to property in which he has no proprietary
interest."' Established in the 1927 case of Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Flint,3' this bright-line rule is a judicially-imposed
limitation on the legal duty of care owed by maritime tortfeasors.32
The rule seeks to limit liability in situations that have wide-reaching
and potentially endless economic repercussions, such as oil spills; it
should not be viewed as "saying that the injury... was unforesee-
able but, rather, as drawing a legal line, based on considerations of
policy."'33 Because it deviates from principles of proximate cause,
the rule is a fertile source of controversy.' 4 Nevertheless, at least
five United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, including the Ninth
Circuit, recognize the Robins doctrine as an enduring aspect of
maritime law.35
30. Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 43 (1972).
31. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
32. See Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1019. In this 10-5 decision, the majority applied
the Robins rule to deny recovery to marina and boat rental operators, wholesale
and retail seafood enterprises not actually engaged in fishing, seafood restaurants,
tackle and bait shops, and recreational fishermen, all of whom had filed claims for
economic loss unaccompanied by physical damage to property resulting from a boat
collision and subsequent chemical spill in the lower Mississippi River. Id. at 1020-
21. The Testbank court appeared to adopt the following explanation of Robins
offered by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean
Dredging, Inc., 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984): "the [Supreme Court of Louisiana]
explained Robins as based on... policy considerations [and concluded] that under
a risk-duty analysis the 'moral, social and economic values involved' did not warrant
extending a duty, and hence liability, to those who might suffer indirect economic
loss[- from an act of negligence." Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1028 (quoting PPG
Industries, 447 So. 2d at 1060-61); see also infra note 178.
33. Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1985).
34. See, e.g., Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Labeling the
Robins rule the "Tar Baby of tort law," Judge Wisdom rejected the necessity of the
physical injury rule and urged that recovery in such cases be determined through
analysis and application of the traditional tort principles of proximate cause and
foreseeability. Id
35. Recovery for pure economic loss is barred in the First, Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50
(1st Cir. 1985); Getty Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. MT Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829 (3d Cir.
1985); Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1032; In re Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d
1201 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984). For a discussion of the
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1. The Origin of the Physical Injury Requirement in Maritime
Law. In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,36 Flint had
chartered a boat pursuant to an agreement which required the boat
to be docked at least once every six months for repairs. During the
period of repair, the payment of the hire was to be suspended. Flint
delivered the vessel at the proper time, but while in dry dock, the
dry dock company negligently damaged the boat's propeller,
necessitating a two-week delay. The company settled with the
owners of the boat, receiving from them a release of all their claims.
Flint brought suit against the dry dock company to recover damages
for the loss of use occasioned by the delay, including the hire he had
been required to pay while unable to use the boat.
The district court held for Flint on the theory that the negli-
gence of the dry dock company violated Flint's proprietary interest
in the vessel. 7 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected this proposi-
tion, but affirmed Flint's right to recover on the ground that the dry
dock company as tortfeasor was liable for the total market value of
the loss of use resulting from the delay. The court reasoned that "if
... the total damages would be divisible," Flint would receive a
proportionate share of "the market value of the use of the vessel for
the period of the delay."3 Since the company had settled with the
owner for the owner's portion of the loss, Flint, according to the
Ninth Circuit's handling of claims for pure economic loss in maritime tort cases, see
infra pp. 13-21.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court, in a recent case concerning
malfunctioning engines on oil-transporting supertankers, held that no strict
products-liability claim "lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic
loss." East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,875 (1986).
While this case is not dispositive on the issue of recovery for economic loss in the
context of other maritime torts, the Court did give a slight indication of where its
sympathies might lie. In stating that "[w]e do not reach the issue whether a tort
cause of action can ever be stated in admiralty when the only damages sought are
economic," the Court inserted a "but see" citation to Robins Dry Dock, indicating
its likely agreement with the rule. Id. at 871 n.6.
36. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
37. Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 1924 Am. Mar. Cases 740,744-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1924).
38. Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3, 5 (2d Cir. 1926).
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Second Circuit, could then sue the dry dock company directly and
recover for his share. 9
The Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the lower courts
and denied recovery, holding that Flint contracted with the owner,
not the dry dock company and, thus, had no "interest protected by
the law against unintended injuries inflicted upon the vessel by third
persons who know nothing of the charter."'  The charterer could
not recover against the dry dock because the "injury to the propeller
was no wrong to [him] but only to those to whom it belonged. 41
In the most famous passage of the three-page opinion, Justice
Holmes declared:
[jW]hile intentionally to bring about a breach of contract may
give rise to a cause of action, no authority need be cited to show
that, as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property
of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another
merely because the injured person was under a contract with
that other unknown to the doer of the wrong. The law does not
spread its protection so far.42
39. Justice Holmes characterized the Second Circuit's opinion as follows: "It
seems to have been thought [by the Circuit Court] that perhaps the whole might
have been recovered by the owners, that in that event the owners would have been
trustees for the respondents to the extent of the respondents' share, and that no
injustice would be done to allow the respondents to recover their share by direct
suit." Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 309.
40. Id. at 308. The interests of charterers, if any, "must be worked out through
their contract relations with the owners" and not on "the postulate that they have
a right in rem against the ship." Id. Justice, therefore, "does not permit that the
petitioner be charged with the full value of the loss of use unless there is some one
who has a claim to it as against the petitioner." Id at 309. "The respondents have
no claim either in contract or in tort, and they cannot get a standing by the
suggestion that if some one else had recovered it he would have been bound to pay
over a part by reason of his personal relations with the respondents." Id.
41. Id. at 308.
42. Id. at 308-09 (citations omitted). Though claiming that no authority was
necessary, Justice Holmes did cite to three other cases as "good statement[s]" of
this principle. See Elliott Steam Tug Co., Ltd. v. The Shipping Controller, 1 K.B.
127, 139-40 (1922) ("The charterer in collision cases does not recover profits, not
because the loss of profits during repairs is not the direct consequence of the
wrong, but because the common law rightly or wrongly does not recognise him as
able to sue for such an injury to his contractual right."); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E.
419 (Ga. 1903) (recovery of lost profits denied where the defendant negligently
damaged a utility's electrical conduits, cutting off power to plaintiff's plant); The
Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir. 1927) (recovery to plaintiff for sums spent
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Thus, while the owner of the boat could maintain an action against
the dry dock company, the third-party charterers could seek
recovery only from the owners on the charter contract.
The decision in Robins reaffirmed settled common law doctrine.
Justice Holmes' opinion "broke no new ground, but instead applied
a principle, then settled both in the United States and England,
which refused recovery for negligent interference with contractual
rights."'43 While the facts of the case dealt with a contract between
an owner and a boat charterer, Justice Holmes wrote in such broad
terms that, over time, the rule he articulated has been interpreted
to bar recovery of economic loss resulting from torts unconnected to
any contractual relationship.' At present, the Robins Dry Dock
rule represents the principle that "a plaintiff may not recover [in
tort] for his economic loss resulting from bodily harm to another or
in maintenance and cure denied where the defendant tug negligently injured the
plaintiff's employee while he was working on a barge, the court holding that "[i]t
is too indirect to insist that this may be recovered, where there is neither the
natural right nor legal relationship between the appellant and the tug").
43. Louisiana ex reL Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir.
1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Professor James, discussing the
history of this rule, has noted the "remarkable parallel between the American
decisions on this point and those in the British Commonwealth." James, supra note
30, at 45. He goes on to state that:
[t]hese developments were largely independent of each other; the courts
in our country rarely have cited British authority, and British courts rarely
cite our decisions. Nevertheless, the developments have been similar even
to details in drawing the line on recovery. Thus, British decisions, which
have allowed recovery for economic consequences to one whose property
was physically injured, but denied recovery for similar loss to one whose
property suffered no physical impairment, have an almost exact American
analogue.
Id. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
44. This development was noted by the court in Testbank, where the court
stated:
Plaintiffs would confine Robins to loss[] suffered for inability to perform
contracts between a plaintiff and others, categorizing the tort as a species
of interference with contract. When seen in the historical context...
however, it is apparent that Robins Dry Dock represents more than a limit
on recovery for interference with contractual rights. Apart from what it
represented and certainly apart from what it became, its literal holding was
not so restricted. If a time charterer's relationship to its negligently
injured vessel is too remote, other claimants without even the connection
of a contract are even more remote.
752 F.2d at 1023.
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from physical damage to property in which he has no proprietary
interest.""* Put another way, a person may not recover damages
for pure economic loss in the absence of physical injury to one's
person or property.
The Robins decision is a confusing opinion, leaving many issues
unresolved.' In the years since Justice Holmes authored the
opinion, however, the Supreme Court has been "virtually . . .
silen[t]"'47 on the issue of maritime recovery for pure economic loss
and has failed to clarify the proper extent of the Robins rule.'
Federal circuit and district courts have attempted to fill this void.
The Ninth Circuit's handling of the Robins doctrine must, therefore,
be analyzed in order to gauge both the applicability of the doctrine
to Alaska oil spill litigation and the potential effect that that
doctrine may have.
2. The Development of the Robins Rule in the Ninth Circuit.
In the sixty-six years since the Robins Dry Dock decision, the Ninth
Circuit has faced the issue of the recoverability of pure economic
loss in the maritime context on several occasions. .While adhering
in principle to the Robins rule, these decisions recognize an
exception to the rule's application for commercial fishermen who
suffer economic injury caused by maritime torts. This exception,
however, does not undermine the legitimacy of the Robins rule.
45. James, supra note 30, at 43.
46. See Louisiana ex reL Guste v. M/V Testbank, 728 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir.
1984) (per curiam) ("In Robins a great judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, had an off-
day."), aff d on reh'g, 752 F.2d 1019 (1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903
(1986); Venore Transp. Co. v. MIV Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978)
("Justice Holmes wrote broadly, as he customarily did."); Cargill, Inc. v. Doxford
and Sunderland, Ltd., 782 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Justice Holmes'
formulation was delivered in different language than we ordinarily use today, but
his meaning has not become outdated. There can be no recovery in tort unless the
defendant has breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff."); 2 FOWLER HARPER
& FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.10, at 330 (2d ed. 1986) ("Much of the
confusion derives from the opinion of Justice Holmes .... ).
47. David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss Under U.S. Maritime Law:
Sixty Years Under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 157, 162 (1987).
48. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
871 n.6 (1986) (leaving open "the issue whether a tort cause of action can ever be
stated in admiralty when the only damages sought are economic").
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In Carbone v. Ursich,49 the Ninth Circuit faced a claim similar
to that in Robins, based upon a third party's negligent interference
with a contract. Fishermen employed as crew members on a
commercial fishing boat had contracted with the owners of the boat
for a pro rata share of sixty-one percent of the net proceeds from
the sale of the fish caught each day. The fishermen had no
proprietary interest in the boat or in the net used to catch the fish,
but made profits solely through their contract with the owner.
Another boat negligently damaged the net by passing too closely to
the fishing boat, resulting in the loss of a substantial amount of fish
in the net at the time. The net was unusable during the time of
repair, causing the fishermen to lose four additional days of fishing.
The fishermen sued the responsible parties to recover the profits
lost due to the escape of the fish in the net as well as for the
prospective profits foregone during the repair period.
The district court found that "the evidence was sufficient, if
recovery was allowed at all, to warrant recovery of damages by [the
fishermen] against the [tortfeasors] not only for the loss of the catch
enclosed in the net.., but also for the loss of prospective catches
of fish during the period mentioned."5 However, a court-appoint-
ed special master filed a report which, citing earlier Ninth Circuit
precedent,5' found that economic loss of this type was not recover-
able. The court accepted the master's findings and dismissed the
case.
52
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit confronted both its earlier decision
denying recovery under similar circumstances 3 and Robins, the
controlling Supreme Court precedent in maritime cases of this
nature. Attempting to circumvent these barriers in favor of the
fishermen, the Carbone court discussed several cases that had
49. 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953).
50. Id. at 179.
51. See Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392, 398 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 905 (1952) (Where fishermen sued the third-party tortfeasor for the loss of
their share of the prospective catch of fish after the third party negligently collided
with a fishing boat, the court held that "their loss ar[ose] solely out of their contract
with the owners ... for a share of the catch and under the rule of the Robins case,"
the fishermen failed to state a claim.).
52. See Carbone, 209 F.2d at 179.
53. See Borcich, 191 F.2d at 398.
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allowed owners of negligently damaged fishing vessels to recover an
amount, in addition to their own damages, sufficient to cover the
lost wages of crew members.' While none of the cases cited
granted crew members standing to sue the tortfeasor directly, they
did rule that the tortfeasor "was liable for amounts thus lost by the
crew and must respond in damages accordingly."'55 The court
emphasized that this "well-established rule" made "wrongdoer[s]
liable not only for the damage done to the fishing vessel, but liable
for the loss[] of the fishermen as well." 56
Tuing to the Robins issue, the court reexamined that holding
and, upon further analysis, determined that the Robins Court "was
there dealing with decidedly different principles than those which
should attach to the situation of these fishermen."'57 The court
argued that despite the Robins rule, fishermen were entitled to
special protection:
[A]Ithough dealing with a well established rule of law of torts,
[the Robins Court] was not thinking of the special situation of
the fishermen who.., had long been recognized as beneficiaries
under a special rule which made the wrongdoer liable not only
for the damage done to the fishing vessel, but liable for the
loss[l of the fishermen as well. This long recognized rule is no
doubt a manifestation of the familiar principle that seamen are
54. See The Mary Steele, 16 F. Cas. 1003 (D. Mass. 1874) (No. 9226) (members
of the crew were allowed to recover jointly with the owners for their shares in
mackerel catches which they lost or were prevented from securing through negligent
injury to the fishing net); Taber v. Jenny, 23 F. Cas. 605 (D. Mass. 1856) (No.
13720) (owners of the fishing vessel were permitted to recover the share belonging
to their crew members in addition to their own damages); United States v. Laflin,
24 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1928) (same).
55. Carbone, 209 F.2d at 180.
56. Id. at 182.
57. Id. at 181. Referring to its view that the right of fishermen to recover lost
earnings was "well-established," the court said of Robins that the "case did not
operate to establish a rule contrary to the previously recognized doctrine that a
respondent in a case of this character, must respond in damages for the loss of the
fishermen's lay share." Id. Rather, "Mr. Justice Holmes ... was familiar" with the
cases establishing that right, and his opinion "contains no internal evidence of an
intention to reverse a course of prior decisions relating to the liability of persons




the favorites of admiralty and their economic interests entitled
to the fullest possible legal protection."
The court allowed recovery,59 thus creating a "fishermen's excep-
tion" to the Robins physical injury rule. The Carbone court did not
intend to overhaul the Robins doctrine, but to make it more
forgiving to fishermen, "the favorites of admiralty."'  The court
still considered the Robins doctrine to be a "well established rule of
law of torts."61
TWenty-one years later, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,62 the
Ninth Circuit faced another claim for economic loss by commercial
fishermen, this time arising from a 1969 oil spill in the Santa
Barbara Channel. The parties had stipulated that Union Oil was
required to compensate the plaintiffs for "all legally compensable
damages arising from a legally cognizable injury."'  Union Oil
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff commercial
fishermen could not recover as an element of such damages "profits
lost as a result of the reduction in the commercial fishing potential
of the Santa Barbara Channel which may have been caused" by the
oil spill.' A special master appointed by the district court denied
58. Id. at 182.
59. To deny recovery "would mean a withholding from fishermen of all redress
for tortious interference with the progress of the voyages which are their
livelihood." Id. at 183.
60. Id. at 182.
61. Id.
62. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
63. The stipulation stated the facts of the case and the damages which Union
Oil had agreed to pay. The third paragraph of the stipulation resolved that:
[i]n order tcr provide a basis for the disposition of the above referenced
claims it is agreed by the undersigned defendants that they will pay.., all
legally compensable damages arising from a legally cognizable injury caused
by the aforementioned occurrence.. . provided however, that the payment
assumed hereby will not exceed such amount and such claim as said
defendants or their contractors would be responsible for in the case of
negligence.
Id. at 559-60 (emphasis added by the court).
64. Id at 560.
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the motion,' as did the district court itself' and Union Oil
appealed.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion firmly established the fishermen's
exception as an enduring aspect of that circuit's jurisprudence and
affirmed Robins' applicability to all other maritime tort situations.67
First, under the standard laid down two years earlier in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,6 the court asserted that the case
was to be decided under maritime law69 since commercial fishing
65. In a brief order, the special master held that injuries resulting from "an
interference by defendants with [plaintiffs'] economic right to fish in public waters"
were legally compensable. Id.
66. The district judge held that "the loss of a prospective economic advantage
occasioned by the alleged diminishment of the quantities of available sea life
formed a sufficient basis for recovery under the law of negligence." Id.
67. The Union Oil decision has, however, been criticized by one commentator:
Nowhere in its analysis ... did the [Union Oil] Court ask who
owned the fish. If the fish were owned by the plaintiffs, the case would
hardly be complex, either in terms of traditional negligence law or in terms
of its modem economic reformulation. "You poisoned my fish," states
ownership and causal connection, while the allegations of negligence
(assuming they are required) have already been made.
Alternatively, the fish might have been owned by no one, in which
event the appropriate precedents are not drawn from tort theory but from
cases concerned with the capture of wild animals .... Such cases have
held that a person in hot pursuit of an animal is not entitled to complain
if someone else captures it first. Presumably he could not therefore
complain if his adversary, having achieved capture, mistreats the animal,
neglects it, or simply kills it. And so it is with unowned fish in [Union
Oil]. The plaintiffs who do not own the fish cannot complain if the Union
Oil Company captures them. As they cannot complain of capture, they
cannot complain of destruction after capture. As they cannot complain of
destruction after capture, they cannot complain of it before capture. No
theory of tortious liability can make up the plaintiffs' deficit attributable
to their want of ownership.
... The result in Union Oil v. Oppen may in fact be correct. Yet
its method of analysis, spurred on by a commendable distaste for pollution,
is fatally flawed.
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 51-52 (1979).
68. 409 U.S. 249 (1972); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. While the court did make a sustained analysis regarding whether California
law or federal maritime law applied, and appeared to side with maritime law, it
finally decided that the result would be the same under either law. Union Oil Co.
v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1974).
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bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."
The court followed with an "abridged collection" of citations
supporting the "widely recognized principle that no cause of action
lies against a defendant whose negligence prevents the plaintiff from
obtaining a prospective pecuniary advantage."'" This general rule,
the court stated, "operates in a wide variety of settings."72
Despite the vitality of the physical injury rule as a controlling
principle of maritime law, however, the court found that the rule
contained exceptions permitting the recovery of pure economic loss
"in instances in which there exists 'some special relation"'73
between the plaintiff and the third-party tortfeasor. One such
special relationship is that between fishermen and other users of the
sea, which requires those in the position of the defendants to
"refrain from negligent conduct.., which . . . reasonably and
foreseeably could have been anticipated to cause a diminution in the
aquatic life in the Santa Barbara Channel area and thus cause injury
to the plaintiffs' business."74 Because damage to the fishermen's
livelihood was a foreseeable consequence of an oil spill, the court
held that the defendant had violated a duty to the commercial
fishermen "to conduct their drilling and production in a reasonably
prudent manner so as to avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic
70. In Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973), a case
arising out of the same oil spin at issue here, the Ninth Circuit had held that
physical injury to maritime vessels and an interference with their right of navigation
constituted maritime torts subject to maritime law. Id. at 257. "In so holding, it
was recognized that the 'activity' whose relationship to traditional maritime activity
was to be examined was that of the injured party, not that of the tortfeasor."
Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 561.
71. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 563 (emphasis added). Among the numerous cases
and law review articles mentioned, the court cited Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), and quoted from Justice Holmes' decision. Id. at 563-
64. Since this was the only United States Supreme Court case cited in the list, it
demonstrates the Ninth Circuit's recognition of Robins as the controlling authority
for cases falling within the "general rule."
72. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 564.
73. d. at 565 (quoting WLLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 952 (4th
ed. 1971)). The court could take notice of these exceptions because "California
does not blindly follow the general rule upon which the defendants here rely."
Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 566.
74. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 568.
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life."' To ensure that its decision remained limited to this excep-
tion and that it could not be interpreted as abrogating the Robins
rule in favor of a traditional tort standard, the court concluded its
opinion by reemphasizing the special nature of the exception and,
in so doing, implicitly indicated its unavailability as a precedent to
other groups seeking recovery for pure economic loss in similar
situations. The court stated that commercial fishermen:
[L]awfully and directly make use of a resource of the sea, viz. its
fish, in the ordinary course of their business. This type of use is
entitled to protection from negligent conduct by the defendants
in their drilling operations. Both the plaintiffs and defendants
conduct their business operations away from the land and in, on
and under the sea. Both must carry on their commercial
enterprises in a reasonably prudent manner. Neither should be
permitted negligently to inflict commercial injury on the other.
We decide no more than this.76
In Carbone, the Ninth Circuit forged an exception to the rule
against recovery for pure economic loss for commercial fishermen
who had a contractual stake in the actual and prospective catch of
a fishing boat rendered unusable by a tortfeasor. The Union Oil
court, relying on the special relationship between fishermen and the
sea, expanded this exception, allowing fishermen with no legally
recognized proprietary interest in the fish prior to a spill to recover
damages against a polluter for a diminution in the aquatic life of the
75. Id. at 570. The court's use of the traditional tort language of foreseeability
has led some to assert that the Ninth Circuit, in its analysis of maritime tort cases,
"rel[ies] on a remoteness analysis according to traditional tort principles and may
possibly allow recovery for economic loss if the damages are sufficiently direct."
See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 13-7, at 472 n.8; Sturla Olsen, Comment,
Recovery for the Lost Use of Water Resources: M/V Testbank on the Rocks?, 67
TUL. L. REv. 271, 280-81 (1992) (In creating the fishermen exception, the Ninth
Circuit "framed its inquiry in terms of duty, proximate cause, and foreseeability...
[and] endorsed this analysis as appropriate in light of various 'exceptions [and]
qualifications to the general rule."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Union Oil, 501 F.2d
at 565)). However, this assertion is weakened by several other aspects of the
decision: the court's citation to, and quoting of, the opinion in Robins; its
qualification to the effect that the exception to the general rule did not go beyond
commercial fishermen; and, in creating the fishermen exception, its emphasis on the
"special relationship" between commercial fishermen and the sea, in that
commercial fishermen make "direct" use of the sea's resources, and that water
pollution directly harms their livelihood.
76. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570-71 (emphasis added).
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sea.7 While this opening might have signalled a willingness to
disregard the Robins rule for classes of victims otherwise barred
from recovery, the Union Oil court put that notion to rest. After
holding that commercial fishermen could advance a claim for
negligent interference with their business, the court stressed that its
"holding... does not open the door to claims that may be asserted
by those, other than commercial fishermen, whose economic or
personal affairs were discommoded by the oil spill."78 The commer-
cial fishermen's exception to the Robins rule thus appears to be the
limit for plaintiffs seeking to recover for pure economic loss.
B. Federal Statutory Law - The Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act
In 1973, Congress passed the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act ("TAPAA"), 79 which was quickly recognized as the
strongest of the federal oil spill statutes." The legislation had two
purposes: (1) to authorize the construction of a trans-Alaska
pipeline system ("TAPS") to transport oil from Alaska's North
Slope to the terminal facilities at Valdez, Alaska;81 and (2) to
77. While the fishermen no longer needed to have a discrete percentage of the
prospective catch to recover, the court did declare that the "reduction of profits
[sought to be recovered] must be established with certainty and must not be remote,
speculative or conjectural." Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
78. Id. (emphasis added); see also In re the Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509,
1518 (D. Alaska 1991) (The Ninth Circuit in Union Oil made an "express disclaimer
of any intention to disavow Robins Dry Dock except for commercial
fishermen.").
79. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
80. David Ashley Bagwell, Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 433, 456 (1988). Other federal oil spill legislation includes: (1) Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1986 & Supp. 1992); (2) Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (known
as CERCLA or the Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp. 1992);
(3) Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1986); (4) Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (1986 & Supp. 1992); and (5) Deepwater Port Act
of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
81. The congressional findings that accompanied the Act declared that the
"early development and delivery of oil and gas from Alaska's North Slope to
domestic markets is in the national interest because of growing domestic shortages




create a scheme of strict liability for damages resulting from a spill
of TAPS oil.'
In establishing the damages section of TAPAA, Congress
sought to ensure that deserving victims of oil spills would receive
prompt compensation without having to resort to prolonged
litigation,' while also encouraging the safe operation of the vessels
involved in transporting oil. To facilitate these goals, Congress
created a $100 million Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund
("Fund"), financed through a five cent per barrel tax on all TAPS
oil. 4 Under section 1653(c)(1) of TAPAA, the owner and opera-
tor of a vessel and the Fund, "notwithstanding the provisions of any
other law," are held strictly liable without regard to fault for any
damages resulting from the discharge of TAPS oil from a vessel. 5
82. The authors of the statute believed that strict liability was necessary because
"existing maritime law would not provide adequate compensation to all victims,
including residents of Canada, in the event of the kind of catastrophe which might
occur" during the transport of the oil. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530.
83. Id.
84. Sections 1653(c)(4) and (5) provide, in relevant part:
(4) The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund is hereby established as a
non-profit corporate entity that may sue and be sued in its own name.
(5) The operator of the pipeline shall collect from the owner of the oil at
the time it is loaded on the vessel a fee of five cents per barrel. The
collection shall cease when $100,000,000 has been accumulated in the
Fund, and it shall be resumed when the accumulation in the Fund falls
below $100,000,000.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1653(c)(4)-(5) (Supp. 1992). Thus, the Fund is essentially a form of
self-insurance paid for by all those who make use of the pipeline to transport oil.
85. Section 1653(c)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, if oil that has been
transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline is loaded on a vessel at the
terminal facilities of the pipeline, the owner and operator of the vessel
(jointly and severally) and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund
established by this subsection, shall be strictly liable without regard to fault
in accordance with the provisions of this subsection for all damages,
including clean-up costs, sustained by any person or entity, public or
private, including residents of Canada, as the result of discharges of oil
from such vessel.
43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1986). The Act covers all spills arising from the discharge
of such oil from any vessel from the time the oil "is loaded on a vessel at the
terminal facilities of the pipeline," continuing through the "transportation between
the terminal facilities of the pipeline and ports under the jurisdiction of the United
States," until the oil is "brought ashore at a port under the jurisdiction of the
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The owner and operator are responsible for the first fourteen
million dollars in claims relating to any one incident." The Fund
is then strictly liable for all claims beyond that amount, up to a
ceiling of $100 million." If the total amount of all claims arising
from a single incident exceeds $100 million, then each claim is to be
reduced proportionately, and the unpaid portion of any claim may
then be asserted and adjudicated under other applicable federal or
state law." In addition, section 1653(c)(8) retains certain rights of
subrogation in favor of the owner or the Fund in situations where
the discharge of oil results from either negligence or the unseawor-
thiness of the vessel.89 Other sections of TAPAA deal with
defenses to the strict liability' and the investment of the Fund
monies.91
Today, nearly twenty years after its passage, TAPAA has
engendered much controversy in pending oil spill litigation. The
primary area of contention concerns the statute's ambiguous
language concerning recoverable damages. The dearth of evidence
regarding the drafters' intent exacerbates this ambiguity. In
United States." 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1), (7) (1986 & Supp. 1992).
86. Prior to gaining the right to transport TAPS oil, the owner and operator of
the vessel must demonstrate financial responsibility for $14 million. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1653(c)(3) (Supp. 1992).
87. The statute provides in relevant part:
Strict liability for all claims arising out of any one incident shall not exceed
$100,000,000. The owner and operator of the vessel shall be jointly and
severally liable for the first $14,000,000 of such claims that are allowed.....
The Fund shall be liable for the balance of the claims that are allowed up
to $100,000,000. If the total claims allowed exceed $100,000,000, they shall
be reduced proportionately. The unpaid portion of any claim may be
asserted and adjudicated under other applicable Federal or state law.
IM2 § 1653(c)(3).
88. IM
89. The statute provides in relevant part:
In any case where liability without regard to fault is imposed pursuant to
this subsection and the damages involved were caused by the unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel or by negligence, the owner and operator of the vessel,
and the Fund, as the case may be shall be subrogated under applicable
State and Federal laws to the rights under said laws of any person entitled
to recovery hereunder.
Id. § 1653(c)(8).
90. The only statutory defenses are act of war, governmental negligence, or
negligence of the injured party. Id. § 1653(c)(2).
91. ML § 1653(c)(7).
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particular, the statute's directive regarding liability for "all damag-
es," while facially straightforward, becomes ambiguous when viewed
in the framework of the general maritime law that TAPAA
allegedly displaced. Ascertaining the true meaning of this language
is crucial to determining the ultimate liability of oil spill defen-
dants.92
C. State Statutory Law - The Alaska Act
The final body of law implicated in the current litigation is an
Alaska statute governing pollution of state waters. The damage and
liability provisions of the Alaska Act,' enacted in 1972, are aimed
at holding those responsible for the unpermitted release of a
hazardous substance' into state waters strictly liable, jointly and
severally, for the resulting damage. The Alaska Act is similar to
TAPAA in that it imposes liability without regard to fault for oil
spills "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,"' and
has as its purpose the protection and safety of Alaska citizens, their
property, and the state's natural resources.
The primary difference between the Alaska Act and TAPAA
relates to the scope of their respective strict liability provisions.
While TAPAA provides a $100 million ceiling for strict liability
claims made against the Fund,' strict liability for damages under
the Alaska Act is unlimited. Furthermore, contrary to the general
rule under federal maritime law, the Alaska Act explicitly allows
recovery of pure economic loss.'
92. See infra part II.B.
93. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (Supp. 1992).
94. "Hazardous substance" is statutorily defined to include oil. ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03.826(5)(B) (1991).
95. The statute provides in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other provision
or rule of law... the following persons are strictly liable, jointly and severally, for
damages ... resulting from an unpermitted release of a hazardous substance."
ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822(a) (Supp. 1992).
96. See supra note 87.
97. Under Alaska Statutes section 46.03.824, damages are defined as
"includ[ing] but ... not limited to injury to or loss of persons or property, real or
personal, loss of income, loss of the means of producing income, or the loss of an
economic benefit." ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.824 (1991); see In re the Glacier Bay,
746 F. Supp. 1379, 1387-88 (D. Alaska 1990) (The Alaska Act does not impose a
physical harm requirement for recovery of damages for economic loss.).
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III. FEDERAL MARITIME LAW VS. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
- THE CONTROLLING LAW FOR "TAPS" OIL SPILLS
The courts involved in the current oil spill litigation have been
faced with two important issues: (1) whether Congress intended
TAPAA's strict liability scheme to preempt the general maritime
law for incidents involving the spill of TAPS oil; and (2) whether
TAPAA, if it does preempt maritime law, incorporated the Robins
physical injury rule into its damages clause. These two inquiries are
independent, and a finding of statutory preemption does not
preclude the conclusion that the statute incorporated into its scheme
a well-known common law principle.
The shipment of oil upon navigable waters bears a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity, and under the Executive
Jet standard," oil spills on navigable waters constitute maritime
torts.' In the absence of federal oil spill legislation, the federal
courts exercise admiralty jurisdiction,"° and general maritime law
applies. When Congress chooses to legislate with respect to oil
spills, those laws prevail over maritime law. The issues, then, are:
(1) whether Congress intended to cover the field and preempt the
general maritime law by passing a statute purporting to govern a
maritime activity; and (2) what standard courts should use to make
this determination.
The standard for determining the preemptive effect of federal
legislation on general maritime law assesses whether the legislative
scheme drafted by Congress directly addresses the question, not
whether Congress "has affirmatively proscribed the use of federal
common law.""1 1 A federal statute will have preemptive effect if,
by applying the maritime law, courts would be abrogating rights and
98. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see also Sisson v. Ruby, 497
U.S. 358, 361-62 (1990) (employing the Executive Jet standard); In re Paradise
Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
99. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
100. See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318,1320 (11th Cir. 1989);
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 3-2, at 61 ("The federal maritime law comes both
from statutes passed by the Congress and from judge-made law. The federal
judiciary both constitutionally and traditionally plays a much greater role in the
development of maritime law than in the development of non-maritime common
law.").
101. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981); Gardiner v. Sea-
Land Service, Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
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remedies that Congress has specifically enacted."° Where Con-
gress has legislated on a matter, "courts need not pause to evaluate
... opposing policy arguments... [for] Congress has struck the
balance."'"°  Consequently, courts attempting to gauge a federal
statute's preemptive effect on maritime law must limit their analysis
to "assess[ing] the scope of the legislation and whether the legisla-
tive scheme addresses the problem formerly governed by federal
[maritime] law.'' 4
A. TAPAA Preempts the General Maritime Law
The starting point for an issue involving statutory construction
is the language of the statute itself."05 TAPAA governs all spills
of "oil that has been transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline"
from vessels "loaded ...at the terminal facilities of the pipe-
line."" Thus, Congress established TAPAA as "'a comprehensive
[strict] liability scheme applicable to damages resulting from the
transportation of trans-Alaska pipeline oil.""' 7 By its plain terms,
then, TAPAA's liability scheme would appear to control maritime
activity involving the transportation of TAPS oil.
TAPAA's comprehensive scope is further clarified in the
legislative history. The House Conference Committee Report
declares that one impetus for the passage of the TAPAA was the
conferees' conclusion "that existing maritime law would not provide
adequate compensation to all victims, including residents of Canada,
in the event of the kind of catastrophe which might occur" through
a spill of TAPS oil."° Congress, therefore, imposed strict liability
upon users of the pipeline in order to ensure that adequate
102. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (refusing to
invoke the general maritime law to provide damages for "loss of society" in death
action when not provided for in the Death on the High Seas Act).
103. Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 947 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 947 (citation omitted); see also In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp.
1379, 1384 (D. Alaska 1990).
105. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981); Blackfeet Indian Tribe v.
Montana Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1988).
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1986).
107. Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 973 F.2d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Kee Leasing Co. v. McGahan, 944 F.2d 577, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1991)).




compensation was available to those injured, and it structured
TAPAA with the purpose that it would "become the controlling
statute with regard to trans-Alaska oil."'"
Courts are in accord with this reading of the statute. For
instance, in Kee Leasing v. McGahan, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendants' motion to limit their liability for the Glacier Bay oil spill
under the terms of the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act ("the
Limitation Act")," ruling that TAPAA controlled.1  Focusing
on the legislative intent behind the two statutes, the court deter-
mined that Congress enacted the Limitation Act to "promote
investment in the American shipping industry,"1 2 while TAPAA's
"comprehensive liability scheme" was intended to operate without
limitation and was designed to "ensure that trans-Alaska oil spill
victims receive prompt compensation without resort to prolonged
litigation."'' The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the Limitation
Act is contrary to every aspect of TAPAA" and that the TAPAA
scheme "simply cannot work if the Limitation Act is allowed to
operate concurrently.""' 4 The court held, therefore, that TAPAA
implicitly repealed the Limitation Act."5  Further, since the act's
provision for strict liability addresses the problem of compensation,
109. Kee Leasing v. McGahan, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991).
110. The Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1986).
Enacted in 1851, the Limitation Act permits vessel owners and charterers who meet
certain conditions to limit their liability for damage caused by their vessel to the
post-accident value of the vessel plus pending freight. Its relevant portion provides:
The liability of the owner of any vessel.., for any loss, damage, or injury
by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture,
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such
owner or owners,shall not ... exceed the amount or value of the interest
of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
Id § 183(a).
111. Kee Leasing, 944 F.2d at 583.
112. Id. at 580.
113. Id at 582. The Ninth Circuit determined that the language found in section
1653(c)(1) ("notwithstanding the provisions of any other law") alone was not
dispositive. Id.; but see In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Alaska
1990) (The "notwithstanding" language "must be read to mean that Section 1653(c)
was not to be modified by any preexisting law, whatever its source.").
114. Kee Leasing, 944 F.2d at 583.
115. ML; see also In re the Glacier Bay, 741 F. Supp 800, 804 (D. Alaska 1990)




which otherwise would be governed by maritime law, TAPAA may
be judged under the prevailing standard to have preempted the
general maritime law in this area.
1. Does TAPAA's Damages Provision Incorporate the Robins
Rule? Although TAPAA expressly allows recovery for "all
damages" resulting from spills of TAPS oil,116 the general rule is
that "statutes which invade the general maritime law are read with
a presumption favoring the retention of long established and
familiar principles except when a statutory purpose to the contrary
is evident."'1 7 Thus, even if TAPAA preempts general maritime
law, the question remains whether the "all damages" clause should
be interpreted against the background of the Robins physical injury
rule. Some district courts have incorporated the Robins rule into
TAPAA, thereby negating the preemption issue; others have opted
for a literal reading of the "all damages" clause, allowing recovery
for pure economic loss. The Ninth Circuit has yet to resolve this
issue.
In Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.,18 a case arising from the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Federal District Court for the Central
District of California addressed the incorporation issue. The
plaintiffs asserted a class action claim under TAPAA, seeking strict
liability recovery for damages incurred due to an alleged increase in
gasoline prices resulting from the spill." The defendants'20 filed
a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the damages sought
were in the form of pure economic loss and thus were barred by the
Robins rule.1
21
In a five-paragraph order, Judge Gadbois of the Central District
granted the defendants' motion. Invoking maritime jurisdiction,"
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1986).
117. Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. at 1384 (citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343
U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
118. 1991 Am. Mar. Cases 769 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
119. See Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
120. The defendant group included Exxon Corporation, Exxon Shipping
Company, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Liability Fund. Id.
121. Id
122. Maritime jurisdiction was warranted "inasmuch as [this case] arises out of
the grounding of the ship Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and the
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the court held that Robins applied and that "there can be no
recovery for a maritime tort where the plaintiff has sustained
economic loss without compensable physical injury to person or
property."" Although the plaintiffs asserted their claims for
economic loss under TAPAA's strict liability provisions, the court
interpreted -the phrase "all damages" as not encompassing pure
economic loss."U Congress, Judge Gadbois stated, had "enacted
[section 1653(c)] against a background of well-established maritime
law, and under settled principles of statutory construction Congress
must be deemed to have incorporated in [section 1653(c)] the
maritime rule of Robins Dry Dock that there can be no recovery for
economic loss absent physical injury.' 125
The Federal District Court for the District of Alaska, in cases
arising from the Glacier Bay and Exxon Valdez spills, has reached
response to the grounding, events that 'occurred on the high seas or navigable
waters' and that have a 'maritime nexus' evidenced by 'a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."' Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 1991 Am. Mar. Cases 769,
769-70 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990); In re Oswego
Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 334 (2d Cir. 1981)).
123. Beneftel, 1991 Am. Mar. Cases at 770 (citation omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. Because neither TAPAA nor its legislative history makes any mention
of the Robins rule, and since TAPAA and Robins can be construed harmoniously,
it followed, the court believed, that TAPAA incorporated Robins. Judge Gadbois
cited four cases as authority for his assertion that a finding of incorporation was
mandated. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,
270 (1979) (since nothing in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act expressly indicates that Congress intended to modify existing maritime law,
the court would read the statute so as to be in harmony with the existing law);
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the
common law or the general maritime law are to be read with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."); United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1970) (It is "a familiar principle of construction that no statute is to be
construed as altering the common law further than its words import." (footnote
omitted)); United States v. Tilleraas, 709 F.2d 1088,1092 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Changes
in or abrogation of the common law must be clearly expressed by the legislature
[and] [e]ven where such an intention is explicit, the scope of the common law will
be altered no further than is necessary to give effect to the language of the
statute.").
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a contrary conclusion.' 6  In Glacier Bay, the court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss all claims that sought recovery for
pure economic loss, including those of commercial fishermen and
non-fishermen such as tenders, fish buyers, fish spotters, fish
processors, and other shoreside businesses.27
Writing for the court, Judge Holland found that the legislative
history, although silent as to Robins" and the scope of the "all
damages" provision, supported an inference that Congress intended
to provide compensation for all victims of an oil spill. 9 He
argued that the language and purpose of TAPAA mandated the
conclusion that "Congress meant to provide adequate compensation
by departing from maritime common law."" °  He also reasoned
that the implementing regulations for TAPAA defined damages in
a way that was "consistent with a literal reading of the term 'all
damages' in the statute."' Thus, "all provable damages sustained
126. See In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990); In re the
Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991); see infra note 133.
127. Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. at 1388.
128. Chief Judge Holland defined the Robins rule as establishing that "in those
situations where negligence does not result in any physical harm, thereby providing
no basis for an independent tort, and only pecuniary loss is suffered, a plaintiff may
not recover for the loss of the financial benefits of a contract or prospective trade."
Id at 1383.
129. Id. at 1386. The court cited the conference committee report statement that
the "Conferees concluded that existing maritime law would not provide adequate
compensation to all victims . .. in the event of the kind of catastrophe which might
occur." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624,93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530.
130. Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. at 1386 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1385-86. Sections 29.1 through 29.14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations contain the implementing regulations for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act. 43 C.F.R. §§ 29.1-14 (1989). Section 29.1(e) defines the term
"damage(s)" in TAPAA to mean:
[A]ny economic loss, arising out of or directly resulting from an incident,
including but not limited to:
(1) Removal costs;
(2) Injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property;
(3) Loss of use of real or personal property;
(4) Injury to, or destruction of natural resources;
(5) Loss of use of natural resources; or
(6) Loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to
injury or destruction of real or personal property or natural
resources, including loss of subsistence hunting, fishing and
gathering opportunities.
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by any person as a result of a TAPS oil spill are compensable and
are not limited by established [common] law.'1 2  The Alaska
court therefore allowed the non-fishermen plaintiffs to proceed with
their claims for pure economic loss. 3
3
In Slaven v. BP America, Inc.,"M a case arising from the
American Trader spill off the coast of California, Judge Kelleher of
the Central District of California disagreed with his colleague Judge
Gadbois, and adopted the position that TAPAA repealed Robins.
Emphasizing the "remedial, beneficial, and amendatory" purpose of
TAPAA and declaring that the "notwithstanding" phrase precluded
the application of any law which served to "alter the liability
provided for therein," the court held that TAPAA overrode Robins
as to any claims for damages falling within the $100 million limit of
the Fund.35 In so holding, the court rejected the defendants'
argument that since Congress failed to specify any proximate cause
requirement in TAPAA, it implicitly adopted Robins as the
Id § 29.1(e).
132. Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. at 1386. In deciding that pure economic loss may
be recovered under TAPAA, Judge Holland did refer to the decision of Judge
Gadbois in Benefiel. Id; see Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 1991 Am. Mar. Cases 769
(C.D. Cal. 1990). Judge Holland acknowledged Judge Gadbois' conclusion that
Congress, by remaining silent in the face of well-established maritime law, must
have incorporated the Robins rule into the statutory scheme. Glacier Bay, 746 F.
Supp. at 1386. However, Judge Holland felt that the California court had
overlooked the "notwithstanding" language in section 1653(c)(1) and had failed to
divine the congressional purpose behind TAPAA, as determined through an
analysis of the legislative history. Id. The lack of analysis in Judge Gadbois' short
decision kept the Alaska court from assigning much persuasive authority to it.
133. In In re the Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991), Judge
Holland, relying on his ruling in Glacier Bay, again concluded that TAPAA, as
specific federal maritime legislation, preempted the maritime law for claims based
on strict liability, at least to the extent of its $100 million coverage:
When Congress enacted TAPAA, Congress spoke directly to the issue of
TAPS oil spills. TAPAA imposes strict liability "notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law" to the extent of $100 million. Therefore, to
the extent of its coverage, TAPAA, as specific federal maritime legislation,
displaces the general maritime law, including the rule of Robins Dry Dock,
regarding strict liability.
Id at 1515 (citation omitted). Since Robins can be applied in harmony with a strict
liability scheme, however, this holding sidesteps the issue of economic loss.
134. 786 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
135. Id at 860.
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applicable proximate cause standard. 36 Judge Kelleher argued
that "[i]t is true that the principle behind Robins is that economic
damages... are too remote to be considered proximately caused by
the defendant's actions. Yet, the bright-line rule of Robins is not a
necessary component of the proximate cause concept.' 1 37 Thus,
the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims under
TAPAA for pure economic loss.
2. The Latest Clues From the Ninth Circuit. In its most
recent case involving TAPAA liability provisions, Benefiel v. Exxon
Corp.," the Ninth Circuit ruled on the appeal of Judge Gadbois'
finding that TAPAA had incorporated the Robins rule.'39 In a
short opinion affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment, the Ninth Circuit avoided a direct discussion of "whether
the physical damage limitation applicable in admiralty applies in this
case after passage of TAPAA '"' by deciding the case on the
narrow proximate cause ground alluded to by Judge Kelleher in
Slaven.'4' The court reasoned "that Congress in enacting TAPAA
did not intend to abrogate all principles of proximate cause."' 42
Rather, "Congress envisioned damages arising out of the physical
effects of oil discharges."'43 The plaintiffs' economic loss, the court
136. Id. at 858.
137. Id. at 858-59.
138. 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1992).
139. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Benefiel is the Ninth Circuit's
first and, to date, only decision addressing TA.PAA's damages provisions. The
Ninth Circuit opinion discussed earlier, Kee Leasing Co. v. McGahan, 944 F.2d 577
(9th Cir. 1991), dealt with TAPAA's implicit repeal of the Limitation of
Shipowner's Liability Act. While the opinion did discuss TAPAA, it did not focus
on the scope of the damages recoverable under the statute.
140. Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 807.
141. Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1992); see supra
note 134 and accompanying text.
142. Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 807. The conference committee report suggests that
Congress intended to benefit those who suffer direct damage. In debating the
merits of strict liability recovery, Congress noted that spills of TAPS oil "could
result in extremely high damages to property and natural resources, including
fisheries and amenities, especially if the mishap occurred close to a populated
shoreline area." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973),
reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523,2530.
143. Benefie 959 F.2d at 807 (emphasis added). The court's subsequent
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concluded, was too "remote and derivative" and "[fell] outside the
zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect when it
passed TAPAA."'
Given the very remote nature of the claim in Benefiel, it was
easy for the Ninth Circuit to deny the claim using traditional
principles of proximate cause. Yet the remoteness of the claim in
Benefiel is also characteristic of the unending sequence of liability
which the Robins bright-line rule seeks to limit. Thus, Benefiel
would have been an ideal case for the Ninth Circuit to articulate its
approval of the Robins doctrine. That the Ninth Circuit declined
this opportunity may suggest that it is not ready to address the more
difficult Robins issue whether to deny claims for pure economic loss
that are proximately caused by a defendant's conduct.
B. TAPAA Should Be Read to Incorporate the Robins Rule
By side-stepping Robins, the Ninth Circuit left unresolved the
district courts' disagreement over the scope of the "all damages"
clause of TAPAA.'45 Nevertheless, the proper conclusion is that
offered by Judge Gadbois in Benefiel, incorporating the Robins rule
discussion of the plaintiffs' claim is instructive:
In this case, the [Exxon Valdez] spill itself did not directly cause any injury
to the appellants. Rather, plaintiffs alleged the spill triggered a series of
intervening events, including the decision of the United States Coast
Guard to close the Port of Valdez to facilitate clean-up efforts; the alleged
decision by refineries in the western United States to raise prices rather
than to use their own oil reserves to make up any shortage; and the
decision of wholesalers, distributors and retailers to pass on these price
increases.
Indeed, the plaintiffs' own complaint alleged that "Exxon and the
other oil companies with refineries in California" maintain sufficient
reserves of crude oil such that the closure occasioned by the spill from the
Exxon Valdez "should not have caused gasoline prices to increase in
California." Thus, plaintiffs themselves alleged the existence of at least one
intervening act causing the price hike: the alleged decision of California oil
refiners to exploit the supposed shortage.
Id. at 807-08 (emphasis added). The court thus placed great importance on the
existence of intervening actions which, together with the spill, caused an economic
loss somewhere down the line. In the case of shoreside businesses in Alaska, such
reasoning could conceivably propel the court to invoke Robins and cut off liability
for pure economic loss, as any number of actions could be pointed to as contribut-
ing factors, or even primary factors, in causing the alleged economic loss.
144. Id. at 807.
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1986); see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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into TAPAA. This conclusion finds support in both the legislative
history of the Act and subsequent case law. The greatest obstacle
to Judge Gadbois' position is the "plain meaning" rule of statutory
interpretation which Judge Holland and Judge Kelleher found
persuasive in rejecting the incorporation of Robins into
TAPAA. 46
Under the "plain meaning" rule, a court interpreting a statute
should begin by examining the language of the statute itself.47
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted recent Supreme Court opinions,
however, as indicating "that the plain meaning rule is no longer
considered an absolute prohibition [against examining other sources
for insight into the meaning of a statute], but a flexible principle for
ascertaining the intent of Congress."' 8 As the Supreme Court
stated in Watt v. Alaska:
[A]scertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single
statute need not end the inquiry ... This is because the plain-
meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule of
law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence
if it exists." The circumstances of the enactment of particular
legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend
words of common meaning to have their literal effect.
149
146. See In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (D. Alaska 1990)
(Holland, J.) ("[IThe plain language of Section 1653(c) is that all provable damages
sustained by any person as a result of a TAPS oil spill are compensable and are not
limited by established maritime law."); Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp.
853, 859 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (Kelleher, J.) ("[T]he Court is of the opinion that the
meaning of the statute can be ascertained from the text alone.").
147. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979).
148. Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 665 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1981).
149. 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (citations omitted). The Court also stated:
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the
meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But
it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not
to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes
always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
Id. at 266 n.9 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words,
as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination."'
(quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940))); see
also Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and
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The scope of TAPAA's liability provision, therefore, should not
be determined simply by looking at its language, but by referencing
other sources such as the legislative history and the common law
background against which the statute was enacted. The following
discussion will examine these sources while remaining true to the
rule that the interpretation selected should avoid unjust results."'
1. Legislative History. Although somewhat ambiguous, the
legislative history of TAPAA suggests that Congress intended to
incorporate the Robins rule into the statute. As justification for
TAPAA, the conference committee report mentions the inability of
"existing maritime law... [to] provide adequate compensation" to
victims of catastrophic oil spills.' The report then discusses the
deficiencies in the liability provisions of the Limitation Acte and
the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.' The Robins rule,
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 1299
(1975) (discussing the Supreme Court's abandonment of the plain meaning rule in
favor of examining legislative history to determine congressional intent).
150. See Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 239 (9th Cir. 1989).
151. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624,93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530.
152. The Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1986);
see also supra note 110.
153. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530; see The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 1155, 1156, 1158, 1160-1175 (1970), superceded by The Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1986 & Supp. 1992). The pertinent portion of
the conference committee report is as follows:
Under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (46 U.S.C. § 183), the owner
of a vessel is entitled to limit his liability for property damage caused by
the vessel to the value of the vessel and its cargo. The value determina-
tion is made after the incident causing the damage. It is therefore quite
possible for injured parties to go uncompensated if a vessel and its cargo
are totally lost. [While the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970
imposed strict liability on owners and operators to cover federal govern-
ment cleanup costs necessitated by an oil spill], [s]tate governments and
private parties are still obliged to proceed under maritime law, subject to
the limits of liability contained in that body of law.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523,2530. The reference to the "limits of liability" contained in the
body of maritime law thus appears to relate back to the preceding discussion of the
Limitation Act, and not to any other unmentioned limits.
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however, was never mentioned." If intentional, this omission
would suggest that Congress's criticism of existing maritime law
applied only to the statutory maritime law and that Congress
adopted the Robins concept of recoverable damages in TAPAA.
Such a reading of the conference committee report is plausible
given the disparate methods by which the Limitation Act and
Robins limit liability. The Limitation Act establishes a ceiling on
the owner/operator's liability at the post-accident value of the vessel
and its cargo, such that liability could be reduced to zero if the
vessel and cargo are totally lost.155 Robins, on the other hand,
while barring all recovery for pure economic loss, places no ceiling
on an owner/operator's liability for physical damages or economic
damages arising from a physical injury. The availability of compen-
sation under the Robins doctrine is far more extensive than that
under the Limitation Act. Unlike the Limitations Act, therefore,
Robins is not antithetical to a comprehensive strict liability scheme
like TAPAA. Given the fact that (1) the Robins rule was not
expressly criticized in the House Conference Committee Report, and
(2) the Robins definition of the term "damages" in the context of
maritime torts had, at the time TAPAA was enacted, been in effect
for more than forty-five years, it is likely that Congress intended to
incorporate Robins into TAPAA."'5
154. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624,93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530.
155. See supra note 110.
156. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558,564 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that
allowing commercial fishermen to recover their pure economic loss caused by an
oil spill was an exception to the general rule). Indeed, numerous cases not subject
to the TAPAA, but decided after its passage, have invoked the Robins rule to deny
claims for pure economic loss in maritime tort cases, demonstrating the continuing
vitality of the rule. See Louisiana ex reL Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019,
1027 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("[T]he decisions of courts in other circuits convince
us that Robins Dry Dock is both a widely used and necessary limitation on recovery
for economic loss[."), cert denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Kingston Shipping Co. v.
Roberts, 667 F.2d 34, 35 (11th Cir. 1982) (denying recovery for economic loss to
owners of vessels delayed when ship channel was blocked due to a maritime
collision); Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers, Inc. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 638
F.2d 700, 702 (4th Cir. 1981) (disallowing claims for pure economic loss suffered
when the defendant's vessel collided with a bridge).
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2. The Underlying Debate - Bright-Line Rule or Case-by-
Case Adjudication. Many courts and commentators have debated
the policy aspects of the Robins rule. The rule has come under
attack by those who would judge liability for pure economic loss
under the traditional proximate cause standards," while others
have supported the rule as a necessary limitation on potentially
endless liability. A brief discussion of the competing frameworks is
helpful in understanding the debate.
Most courts and commentators agree that there is some point
at which liability for economic loss must be limited in order to
prevent extraordinary impositions of liability.5 8 For example,
consider the case of a local bait-and-tackle shop that suffers
economic loss resulting from a spill that fouls the surrounding water
and causes people to fish elsewhere. The shop's claim against the
oil company could be that such loss was proximately caused by the
spill's detrimental effect on ocean life and that the consequences of
an ocean spill were foreseeable. Using the same rationale, the
shop's supplier could seek recovery since the loss it suffers due to
the bait-and-tackle shop's decreased business meets the same tests
of proximate cause and foreseeability. This scenario could be
extended to every tangentially affected business. The specter of
limitless liability could, in this situation, become a reality. Following
the logic of Robins, some courts have concluded that "the chain of
causation must be cut at a relatively early link in order to avoid
burdening society and the courts with the domino effect" leading to
enormous liability exposure to remote plaintiffs."9 Other courts
try to limit liability using principles of proximate cause.'o Regard-
less of the approach, all courts agree that if the chain is not severed
at some point, the consequence would be "liability in an indetermi-
157. See Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
158. Owen, supra note 47, at 163 ("There is rather general agreement that policy
considerations require some rationale or formula which limits liability for economic
loss.").
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding that "a series of intervening events" occurred between the oil spill and
subsequent rise in gasoline prices); Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853,
858-59 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("[E]conomic damages... are too remote to be considered
proximately caused .... ").
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nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class."'61 The fundamental question, therefore, is which approach
most fairly limits liability exposure.
a. The Practical Appeal of Robins. Part of the appeal of
the Robins doctrine lies in its resilience and vitality throughout a
period when courts generally expanded the scope of tort liability.
Justice Holmes' opinion in Robins was written ten years after
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,62 the seminal case in which
Judge Cardozo put an end to the doctrine of privity in products
liability." Robins survived over the ensuing decades despite
attempts to expand liability for pure economic loss so as to make
such recovery consistent with loss for physical injury." The push
161. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
162. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
163. The common law doctrine of privity in products liability held that "the
original seller of goods was not liable for damages caused by their defects to anyone
except his immediate buyer, or one in privity with him." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 96, at 681 (5th ed. 1984). In
MacPherson, Cardozo found the manufacturer of a defective automobile liable to
the ultimate purchaser, even though the purchaser bought the car from an
intermediate dealer. 111 N.E. at 1053.
164. James, supra note 30, at 46. James further notes that:
[t]his failure of the movement to gain momentum takes on added
significance when it is put into context. It coincided with a veritable
ground swell in the law of negligence that pushed liability for physical
injuries toward the full extent of what was foreseeable and shattered
ancient barriers to recovery based on limitations associated with privity of
contract and similar restrictive concepts.
Id. at 47. See also Louisiana ex reL Guste v. MIV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023
(5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("Retention of this conspicuous bright-line rule in the face
of the reforms brought by the increased influence of the school of legal realism is
strong testament both to the rule's utility and to the absence of a more 'conceptual-
ly pure' substitute."), cert denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Owen, supra note 47, at 163
(The rule's "vitality is underscored by the fact that it developed during a period of
great expansion in tort liability, maritime and otherwise."). Owen also notes that
"two of our most distinguished state court judges [Judge Traynor in California and
Judge Cardozo in New York], renowned for their liberal philosophy in the tort
field, clamped down hard on recovery for indirect economic loss." Id. at 164. The
leading article promoting the call for change in this area, Charles E. Carpenter's
Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928), was published
three months after the Robins opinion. But "[w]hat is relevant here is that the
courts did not follow Professor Carpenter's call to abandon the physical injury
requirement." Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1023 nA.
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to extend liability in this direction, however, had failed by the early
1940's, leaving the Robins rule as an accepted doctrine of maritime
law. While the mere longevity of a particular legal doctrine is not
by itself indicative of its utility or strength, the fact that the Robins
rule has survived attack and continues to be applied does "suggest
that the restrictive rule may represent good sense."'1 65
Another aspect that lends appeal to the Robins doctrine is its
use as a "bright-line" rule, invoking an absolute bar on all recovery
of pure economic loss.'6 By cutting off liability at an easily
distinguishable point, the Robins rule makes recovery quicker and
more complete for those victims who fall within its scope. In this
light, the Robins doctrine is consistent with the legislative intent
underlying TAPAA. The conference committee report states that
the purpose of section 1653(c) is to compensate victims of cata-
strophic oil spills adequately.67 While TAPAA holds owners and
operators responsible for the first fourteen million dollars in claims
relating to one accident, all claims exceeding that amount, up to
$100 million, are paid out of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability
Fund.'6 Given the size of the Fund, it can virtually guarantee full
165. James, supra note 30, at 48.
166. E.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (lst Cir. 1985);
Getty Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. MT Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1985); Testbank, 752
F.2d at 1029.
167. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530.
168. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (Supp. 1992). While there are no indications as to
why Congress chose to settle on a $100 million limit, the legislative history is quite
specific about why Congress chose to limit the strict liability exposure of owners
and operators to $14 million. The conference committee report states:
Strict liability is primarily a question of insurance. The fundamental reason
for the limits placed on liability in the Federal Water Quality Improvement
Act stemmed from the availability, or non-availability, of marine insurance.
Without a readily available commercial source of insurance, liability
without a dollar limitation would be meaningless and many independent
owners could not operate their vessels. Since the world-wide maritime
industry claimed $14 million was the limit of the risk they would assume,
this was the limit provided for in the Federal Water Quality Improvement
Act. There has been no indication that this level has since increased.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2530 (emphasis added). Thus, the liability plan called for
owner and operator strict liability for the first $14 million in damages, while the
Fund was potentially responsible for an additional $86 million. The Fund also
retained subrogation rights such that it could proceed against the responsible parties
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recovery, provided the number of possible claimants is appropriately
limited.
The goal of providing adequate compensation, however, might
be frustrated if all spill victims could seek recovery under the Fund.
Those plaintiffs whose only injury consists of pure economic loss
would race against those with claims related to physical damage to
file a claim with the Fund. As the number of claims increased and
the dollar amount of the claims exceeded $100 million, the pro rata
share of each would decrease. Those with physical damage claims
that did not receive full compensation would be forced to litigate
outside of the Fund, thereby losing the intended benefit of TAPAA
- quick and adequate compensation.69
for the amount of claims which it had already paid.
The possibility of holding owners and operators strictly liable for pure
economic loss would undercut Congress's express concern for the fate of
independent owners facing oil spill liability. It may be assumed that when the
world-wide maritime insurance industry concluded that $14 million in coverage was
the most it would extend, it had in mind the maritime concept of damages: those
connected with a physical injury. If pure economic loss was recoverable under the
Act, "the potential breadth [of such liability] . . . taken together with the
uncertainty about the extent of each plaintiff's injury, undoubtedly [would] have an
adverse effect upon the feasibility of insuring against liability of this nature."
James, supra note 30, at 51. Had the industry known that pure economic loss
would be recoverable, it is conceivable that the maritime insurers, realizing how
quickly the $14 million ceiling could be reached, would have lowered their exposure
even further, making it more difficult for independents to operate. See id. at 53
("From an insurer's point of view it is not practical to cover, without limit, a
liability that may reach catastrophic proportions, or to fix a reasonable premium on
a risk that does not lend itself to actuarial measurement."). Although providing
quick, efficient compensation to victims was the main purpose behind TAPAA's
liability scheme, Congress intended to accomplish this purpose without creating
insurmountable barriers to independents wishing to operate in the oil industry. The
fact that the maritime insurance industry would not expose itself above a certain
limit, a limit that Congress expressly accepted, is a good indication that it alerted
Congress to these concerns and that Congress took such considerations into account
when drafting TAPAA's liability provisions.
169. Those with unsatisfied pure economic loss claims would be barred by
Robins from seeking recovery outside the Fund. See Slaven v. BP America, Inc.,
786 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1992), where the court also foresaw this "race to the
Fund" problem:
If recovery under TAPAA is nonRobins and recovery beyond TAPAA is
limited by Robins then in a spill with damages that exceed $100 million,
the ability to recover for economic damages and the extent of the liability
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The potential effect of limitless liability on those in the oil
industry became apparent in the days leading up to the passage of
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"), 70 Congress's response to
the Exxon Valdez disaster. On June 11, 1990, in anticipation of
OPA's passage and its provisions for potentially unlimited lia-
bility,17 1 Shell Oil announced a policy by which it would use only
chartered vessels to carry its oil to the United States mainland, using
for those damages will depend upon tactical maneuvering. Since parties
with solely economic damages can recover only under TAPAA, they will
want to persuade plaintiffs who could alternatively recover under other
laws, to use those other laws and save the TAPAA $100 million for their
solely economic damages. Thus, two identical spills could result in vastly
different recovery and liability depending upon how the claims were
arranged.
Id. at 864. In Slaven, the defendants argued that the purpose of TAPAA was to
provide a greater degree of compensation to victims of spills by creating a fund to
pay those already entitled to relief under existing law. Increasing the classes of
people who could claim under the Fund, they argued, would defeat this purpose by
diluting the pool. Id. at 859. The court disagreed, stating that Congress's purpose
was to provide better relief to all victims. Id.
170. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. 1992). With the passage of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, Congress sought to supersede TAPAA's liability provisions with a
comprehensive reform of oil pollution legislation. This Act included amendments
to TAPAA as well as new substantive legislation. In the amendments to TAPAA,
known as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Reform Act of 1990, Congress added
subsections (13) and (14) to section 1653(c). Subsection (13) defines damages in
this way:
For any claims against the Fund, the term "damages" shall include, but not
be limited to -(A) the net loss of taxes, revenues, fees, royalties, rents, or other
revenues incurred by a State or a political subdivision of a State due to
injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural
resources, or diminished economic activity due to a discharge of oil; and
(B) the net cost of providing increased or additional public services
during or after removal activities due to a discharge of oil, including
protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, incurred by a State or
political subdivision of a State.
43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(13) (Supp. 1992). Subsection (14) mandates that subsections
(c)(1)-(13) shall apply only to claims arising from incidents occurring before August
18,1990. Id. § 1653(c)(14). As is apparent, however, these new sections refer only
to damages incurred by governmental entities and have no bearing on the issue at
hand.
171. The statute does set limits on liability, but these limits do not apply to
accidents caused by gross negligence or those that occur in violation of federal
safety regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (Supp. 1992).
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its own tankers only for transport to the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port."7 The reason for this change in policy, Shell explained, was
that the risks of unlimited liability in the United States outweighed
the commercial rewards."7 Other domestic coastal traders also
announced that they would discontinue business in states with
onerous oil spill liability statutes.174 Intertanko, the oil tanker
owners' organization, warned that vast increases in the potential
liability of those involved in oil spills, such as provided in the
OPA,'75 would increase the risk of a spill by encouraging large
companies with good tankers and deep pockets to abandon the oil
transportation business, leaving only single-vessel companies
unrelated to the oil company whose oil it is carrying to ship oil to
the United States. Limitless liability, some felt, "would mean
American oil would be imported in tankers by dubious one-ship
companies that will walk away from the ship in the event of spill,"
leaving spill victims without compensation. 76
b. Duty, Proximate Cause and the Economics of Economic
Loss. Robins' pragmatic, bright-line limitation on liability,
however, has been criticized as arbitrary, illogical, and violative of
traditional tort principles."7 In contrast to the application of a per
se bar to recovery, critics of Robins advocate a case-by-case
approach by which courts analyze each situation under conventional
tort concepts of duty78 and proximate cause. 79 They argue that
172. Antonio J. Rodriquez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15
TuL. MAR. L.J. 1, 25 n.157 (1990) (citing Smith, Shell Halts Calls at US Mainland,
Lloyd's List, June 12, 1990, at 1, col. 2).
173. Id.
174. Texaco, Amerada Hess, and Maritrans Operating Partners announced their
intention to cease doing business at Maine ports. Id. at 26 n.164 (citing Wall Street
Journal, July 26, 1990, at B4, col. 3).
175. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (Supp. 1992).
176. Rodriquez and Jaffe, supra note 172, at 26 n.163 (citing U.S. Congress Ends
16-Year Stalemate on Oil Spill Legislation, 13 Oil Spill Intelligence Rep. 1, 3
(1990)).
177. But see infra text accompanying notes 184-188.
178. The existence of duty is a question of law reserved for the court. E. Wayne
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1, 26. In determining the
existence of duty,
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since the transport of oil over navigable waterways involves many
risks, oil carriers owe a duty to the public to conduct their activities
with reasonable care. The foreseeable consequence of breaching
this duty is an oil spill that causes vast damage to natural resources
and property, and leads to diminished business activity in the
affected area. Under traditional tort principles, therefore, a plaintiff
suffering pure economic loss in connection with a spill could
conceivably show both a breach of duty and proximate cause and
should be allowed to recover.
The advantage of the case-by-case approach is that it provides
courts with the flexibility to make judgments as to liability on the
particular facts of each case. Recognizing the existence of a duty to
use reasonable care when transporting oil, courts can grant recovery
'[t]he court must balance the following factors in each particular case: (1)
the foreseeability of harm to plaintiff; (2) degree of certainty that plaintiff
suffered injury; (3) closeness of connection between defendant's conduct
and injury suffered; (4) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct; (5)
policy of preventing future harm; (6) extent of burden to defendant and
the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach; (7) availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.'
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 163, § 53, at 359 n.24 (quoting Vu v. Singer
Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981)). Generally, "courts will find a
duty where . . . reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that
it exists." Id at 359.
179. The concept of proximate cause is used to link the defendant's wrongful
conduct to the harm suffered by the plaintiff through the analysis of "two distinct
issues... cause in fact and proximate cause." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 363 (5th ed. 1990). Cause-in-fact denotes the "empirical
questions of causal connection [between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's
injury] that have to be resolved in any tort suit." Id. Once this connection is
established, the "conceptual" issue of proximate cause arises. Id. at 364. At this
level, two inquiries are made: whether, from the point of view of the defendant at
the time he acted, the ensuing chain of events resulting in the plaintiff's injury was
foreseeable; and whether, looking back from the time of injury to the defendant's
actions, "any act of a third party or the plaintiff, or any natural event, severed the
causal connection between the harm and the defendant's wrongful conduct." Id.
If the resulting injury was foreseeable, and no intervening causes disrupted the
natural chain of events, then the defendant's actions are the proximate cause of the
injury. Id. Proximate cause "normally presents an issue for the trier of fact to
resolve, but [state] and federal law recognize that where causation cannot be
reasonably established under the facts alleged by the plaintiff, the question of
proximate cause is one for the court." Benefiel v. Exxon Corp, 959 F.2d 805, 808
(9th Cir. 1992).
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for pure economic loss to spill victims who demonstrate proximate
cause. Yet courts can also deny recovery when intervening causes
render an injury too remote from the defendant's actions to justify
saddling the defendant with liability."u
There are, however, administrative and theoretical difficulties
inherent in a case-by-case approach" to adjudication. Proponents of
the Robins rule note that in the context of pure economic loss,
where each succeeding claimant's direct connection to the tortious
conduct is more attenuated than the last, the point at which a court
decides that one plaintiff may recover while another is too remote
is often more arbitrary and illogical than a bright-line rule that cuts
off liability at a readily distinguishable point. As the majority in
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank argued, "the line drawing
[under a case-by-case approach] is no less arbitrary [than under the
Robins rule] because the line drawing appears in the outcome - as
one claimant is found too remote and another is allowed to
recover."'' Furthermore, bright-line rules, unlike a case-by-case
approach, allow courts to perform their proper adjudicative function
rather than expend scarce judicial resources overseeing mass,
speculative litigation." As Judge Gee stated in his Testbank
concurrence, "the dispute-resolution systems of courts are poorly
equipped to manage disasters of such magnitude and [the courts]
should be wary of adopting rules of decision which... encourage
the drawing of their broader aspects before us.""
180. In Benefiel, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' pure economic loss
claims on the ground that "a series of intervening events" occurred between the oil
spill and the subsequent rise in gasoline prices, including "the decision of the
United States Coast Guard to close the Port of Valdez to facilitate clean-up efforts;
the alleged decision by refineries in the western United States to raise prices rather
than to use their own oil reserves to make up any shortage; and the decisions of
wholesalers, distributors and retailers to pass on these price increases." 959 F.2d
at 807-08. The court ruled as a matter of law that proximate cause could not be
established under these facts. Id. at 808.
181. 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903
(1986).
182. "The point is not that such a process cannot be administered but rather
that its judgments would be much less the products of a determinable rule of law."
Id. at 1023.
183. Id. at 1032 (Gee, J., concurring).
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The Robins rule, moreover, is consistent with tort principles in
that it is a judicially-imposed limit on the duty owed by maritime
tortfeasors. Duty is a fundamental element of a negligence claim,
and is distinct from proximate cause:"s
The determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes
the particular risk imposed on the victim ultimately rests upon
broad policies which underlie the law. These policies may be
characterized generally as morality, the economic good of the
group, practical administration of the law, justice as between the
parties and other considerations relative to the environment out
of which the case arose."l
In traditional tort law, the threat of liability is used to influence
human behavior and deter people from acting in detriment to the
interests of others. Generally, the existence of a duty is conceded
and litigants dispute only proximate cause.Y In the era of mass
torts, however, courts often begin with a duty analysis, first
determining whether "the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal
protection from the defendant's conduct."1' 7  Thus, courts may
reject some actions before even reaching the proximate cause issue
in the belief that "[r]easonable limits on a tortfeasor's responsibility
are necessary both to facilitate the judicial administration of
compensation for claims and to avoid stretching the third party
system of liability insurance to the breaking point.""
The Testbank court discussed the issue of efficient cost
administration in maritime disasters, observing that placing the full
costs of accidents upon the maritime industry would atfirst provide
an incentive for safety. However, at some level, "[a]s the costs of
an accident become increasing multiples of its utility... there is a
point at which greater accident costs lose meaning, and the incentive
curve flattens... [and] the value of the exercise is diminished."189
184. See supra note 178. In Palsgraff v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928), the court, finding as a matter of law that no duty was owed to the plaintiff,
concluded that "[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate" need not be addressed
"in the case before us." Id. at 101.
185. Thode, supra note 178, at 28 (quoting Leon Green, Duties, Risks, Causation
Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42, 45 (1962)).
186. Id. at 26.
187. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 163, § 53, at 357.
188. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, § 13-7, at 471.
189. Louisiana ex reL Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
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Because liability insurance may not be obtainable for pure economic
loss, the court believed that such loss was better protected through
first-party loss insurance. The court argued that:
[w]ith a disaster inflicting large and reverberating injuries
through the economy, as here, we believe the more important
economic inquiry is that of relative cost of administration, and
in maritime matters administration quickly involves insurance.
Those economic losses not recoverable under the [Robins] rule
for lack of physical damage to a proprietary interest are the
subject of first party or loss insurance. ... Each businessman
who might be affected by a disruption of river traffic or by a halt
in fishing activities can protect against that eventuality at a
relatively low cost since his own potential losses are finite and
readily discernible."9
The court concluded that "to the extent economic analysis informs
our decision here, we think that it favors retention of the [Robins]
rule."'191
Economic consequences are a driving force behind courts'
decisions to draw bright-line rules. Under Learned Hand's
influential formula for duty, a duty to take precautions exists
where the burden of such precautions is less than the expected cost
of the accident."9 The burden of precautions includes the "extent
of burden to [the] defendant and the consequences to the commu-
nity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach.""9
Under a pure economic analysis, an oil spill may at first glance
seem to satisfy the Hand formula and require imposition of liability
on the tortfeasors. The probability of such a spill is low, but the
potential magnitude of the resulting harm is so great that the
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), a barge
left unattended for several hours in a busy harbor broke away from its moorings
and collided with another vessel. Judge Hand pronounced his influential BPL test
for determining whether the alleged tortfeasor had breached a duty:
[T]he owner's duty... to provide against resulting injuries is a function of
three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the
gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether... B < PL.
Id- at 173.
193. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 163, § 53, at 359 n.24.
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product of "BP" would appear to be greater than the burden of
taking adequate precautions. This result is correct with regard to
physical injury to persons or property, but not with regard to pure
economic loss. The magnitude of resulting harm for economic loss
is in fact low, for the diminished business activity in the spill area is
offset by gains elsewhere as consumers shift their spending to other
locales. Holding the defendant liable for such damages "would
result in a damage award greater than the net harm inflicted and
could therefore result in over-deterrence of negligent conduct.
194
In some instances, application of the Robins rule will result in
inequity. In many others, however, invoking the rule to cut off
liability at an easily distinguishable point will not only speed
disposition of valid claims and prevent judicial gridlock, but also
prevent easily targeted defendants from being singled out for
punishment disproportionate to their fault. The vitality of the rule
over the years, coupled with its omission from the House Confer-
ence Committee's criticism of other long-standing maritime laws, as
well as Congress's apparent recognition of the practical limitations
of oil carrier liability, suggests that Congress did take into account
the policy considerations underlying the Robins rule when drafting
TAPAA. In addition, Congress's failure to overrule Robins after
the Exxon Valdez incident, in the face of continuing controversy
over the rule in the circuit courts, further evidences congressional
recognition of the rule's utility and a continuing intent to be bound
by it.
194. See Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 159, 169 (1986). Discussing the case of Rickards v. Sun
Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267 (NJ. 1945) (ruling that economic loss caused to island
merchants when the defendant's ship collided with the bridge connecting the island
to the mainland was unrecoverable), Judge Posner explained the court's holding in
the following manner:
The economist explains this result by noting that most and perhaps all of
the plaintiffs' loss was balanced by gain to others, namely the mainland
merchants whose businesses picked up when their competitors on the
island were put out of the reach of consumers .... [M]aking the defendant
liable for the loss it inflicted on the island merchants would result in a
damage award greater than the net harm inflicted and could therefore
result in overdeterrence of negligent conduct.




IV. STATE STATUTORY LAW VS. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
- THE EFFECT OF THE ALASKA AcT
The State of Alaska passed the Alaska Act in order to punish
those responsible for the discharge of hazardous substances as well
as to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, their
property, and the natural resources of the state.'9 5 So defined, it
is a legitimate exercise of Alaska's police power.9 6 Pursuant to
the exercise of that power, a state and its instrumentalities "may act,
in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities,
concurrently with the federal government."'" As long as the state
action in the maritime area supplements the federal legislation, it is
permissible; only when the state action comes into conflict with the
federal action or has unduly burdensome effects on maritime
activities may it be limited. 8
In determining whether federal legislation has, in fact, pre-
empted state action in a particular area, courts must look beyond
the fact that Congress has chosen to legislate in that area. The
intent of Congress:
[T]o supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as to
matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be
inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circum-
scribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
195. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (Supp. 1992).
196. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,442 (1960)
(Air pollution legislation "clearly falls within the exercise of even the most
traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.").
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
The basic limitations upon local legislative power in [the maritime area]
are clear enough. The controlling principles have been reiterated over the
years in a host of this Court's decisions. Evenhanded local regulation to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid unless preempted by
federal action or unduly burdensome on maritime activities or interstate
commerce.
Huron Portland Cement, 362 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted); see Florida Lime and
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963) (A state statute will not
be preempted unless it is in "irreconcilable conflict with the federal regulation" or
unless preemption was the clear intent of Congress.); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947) (noting that "exclusion
of state action may be implied from the nature of the legislation and the subject
matter although express declaration of such result is wanting").
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words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress
fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state.'
Thus, if TAPAA's strict liability scheme provides for actions or
remedies in "actual conflict" with those mandated in the Alaska Act,
it will be judged to have preempted the Alaska Act and suits
brought under the Alaska Act for TAPS oil spills will fail to state
a claim for damages adequately.
The Federal District Court for the District of Alaska deter-
mined that TAPAA and the Alaska Act were not in conflict. In In
re the Exxon Valdez, the plaintiffs brought claims under
TAPAA and the Alaska Act seeking recovery for pure economic
loss, and the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings,
asserting that the damages sought were barred by the Robins rule.
The case required the court to determine which law governed the
economic loss claims.
Applying the literal interpretation of TAPAA's "damages"
clause, the court found that the statutes could be construed
harmoniously, as both purported to impose liability without regard
to fault upon the responsible parties for all damages, including pure
economic loss.2 °1 Though the Alaska Act's strict liability is
unlimited and TAPAA's is capped at $100 million, in "the limited
situation ... where the oil spill was of TAPS oil, the Alaska Act
and TAPAA do not conflict to the extent of $100 million."2"
Thus, "[f]or the first $100 million of damage resulting from a TAPS
oil spill, the remedy would be uniform whether the claims were
brought under TAPAA or the Alaska Act."' If state and federal
statutes governing the same area apply a uniform remedy, they are
199. Huron Portland Cemen4 362 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added); see also Askew
v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,341 (1973) (recognizing that where
"Congress has acted in the admiralty area, state regulation is permissible, absent a
clear conflict with the federal law"); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S.
1, 10 (1937) (establishing that the conflict between the state and federal regulation
be so clear "that the two acts (state and federal) cannot 'be reconciled or
consistently stand together').
200. In re the Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991).
201. Id. at 1517.
202. Id. at 1515.
203. IM; see also In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379,1387 (D. Alaska 1990)
("To the extent that Alaska imposes strict liability in excess of $100 million, there
is no conflict between TAPAA and the Alaska Act.").
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not in "actual conflict," so claims under each can proceed in
harmony.
However, if TAPAA contains a physical injury requirement, as
argued by both Judge Gadbois in Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.' and
above, it would conflict with the Alaska Act on the issue of recovery
for pure economic loss. In this regard, for damage claims up to
$100 million, TAPAA would preempt the Alaska Act, and those
seeking recovery for economic loss would be denied recourse to the
Fund. 5  However, claims for damages related to physical or
204. 1991 Am. Mar. Cases 769 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
205. While negating the economic loss provision in the Alaska Act will work to
the detriment of a large class of plaintiffs, in actuality, this would bring the Alaska
Act into harmony with Alaska law on the recovery of economic loss in other areas
of tort. In a long line of product liability cases, the Alaska Supreme Court has
denied relief to plaintiffs seeking strict liability recovery for economic loss
unconnected to a physical or proprietary injury. See Kodiak Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 153 (Alaska 1984) ("In order to prevail on a
claim of strict liability in tort... when no personal injury has occurred, the plaintiff
must show 'property damage' as opposed to economic loss."); State ex rel. Smith
v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 1984) ("For the purpose of
strict liability, recovery for economic loss is limited to contractual remedies.");
Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Catepillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 326-27
(Alaska 1981) ("[W]here the injury involves only economic loss, as where the
product itself fails to function, the purchaser has merely lost the benefit of his
bargain... [and h]is recovery must therefore rest on warranty, not strict liability
in tort."); see also Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 n.7 (Alaska 1977)
(Alaska does "not recognize a cause of action in strict liability for economic loss.").
The vast majority of jurisdictions "have not permitted recovery of purely economic
loss'" because "permitting recovery under strict liability in tort for economic loss
would jeopardize rights granted a manufacturer by the legislature under the
Uniform Commercial Code." Tyonek Timber, 680 P.2d at 1151. The court's
reasoning in Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., is instructive:
[Ti]his strict liability remedy would be completely unrestrained by
disclaimer, liability limitation and notice provisions. Further, manufactur-
ers could no longer look to the Uniform Commercial Code provisions to
provide a predictable definition ofpotential liability for direct economic loss.
In short, adoption of the doctrine of strict liability for economic loss would
be contrary to the legislature's intent . . . and would vitiate clearly
articulated statutory rights. This we decline to do.
548 P.2d 279, 286 (Alaska 1976) (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court's
clear concern with potentially open-ended liability for economic loss meshes with
those concerns underlying the Robins rule. In the end, interpreting TAPAA so as
to negate the economic loss clause in the Alaska Act merely serves to bring that
statute into line with state tort doctrine generally.
1993]
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proprietary injury could still be brought under the Alaska Act if the
plaintiff preferred a state forum.
V. STATE STATUTORY LAW VS. FEDERAL MARITIME LAW -
THE APPLICATION OF THE ROBBINS RULE TO CLAIMS FALLING
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF TAPAA
Denying recovery for economic loss under the Alaska Act for
the first $100 million in damages does not entirely negate that
statute's scheme. TAIPAA encourages state action in the area of oil
spill legislation, and specifically provides that section 1653(c) as a
whole "shall not be interpreted to preempt the field of strict liability
or to preclude any State from imposing additional require-
ments." In addition, the legislative history accompanying the
statute exphins that "[t]he States are expressly not precluded from
setting higher limits or from legislating in any manner not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Act."' The congressional intent,
therefore, was to impose strict federal liability up to a certain point,
while leaving the states free to impose even stricter regulations if
they saw fit to do so.' The State of Alaska did so choose. Thus,
another issue in this litigation, apart from the question of the proper
definition of damages to apply to claims made under TAPAA, is the
choice of law to apply to those claims which exceed the $100 million
limit of TAPAA.
Section 1653(c)(3) of TAPAA states that "[i]f the total claims
allowed exceed $100 million, they shall be reduced proportionately"
and the "unpaid portion of any claim may be asserted and adjudi-
cated under other applicable Federal or state law."2' Although
Robins would deny recovery to all pure economic loss claims
litigated outside the Fund, the Alaska Act's provision for unlimited
strict liability does encompass economic loss. In determining the
preemptive effect of state law on general maritime law, the courts
206. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9) (1986).
207. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2531.
208. Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 862 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("[I]t is
clear that Congress intended to allow recovery of damages beyond those provided
for under TAPAA under either federal or state laws or both.").
209. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (Supp. 1992).
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involved in the current litigation have again come to differing
conclusions.
In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,2 10 the
United States Supreme Court enunciated the standard by which to
determine whether general maritime law preempted a state statute:
[A] state may modify or supplement maritime law... provided
that the state action "does not contravene any acts of Congress,
nor work any prejudice to the characteristic features of the
maritime law, nor interfere with its proper harmony and
uniformity in its international and interstate relations.' 211
Any state regulation that seeks to supplement the general maritime
law, therefore, must be directed toward an issue of local concern,
and its operation must not disrupt the uniformity of the maritime
legal system.2 12 Thus, for the Alaska Act to overcome the Robins
rule, its provisions must be seen as governing a matter of great local
concern such that the state's interest overcomes the federal interest
in uniformity and its operation must not disrupt rights available to
parties under general maritime law.
In the Exxon Valdez case,213 the Alaska court found that
when claims exceeded $100 million and TAPAA ceased to apply,
the Alaska Act's provision for unlimited strict liability for all
damages, including economic loss, conflicted with the Robins rule.
While "[s]tate law may supplement federal maritime law... state
law may not conflict with federal maritime law, as it would be
redefining the requirements or limits of a remedy available at
admiralty.5214
Section 1653(c)(9) of TAPAA did reserve the right of states to
impose strict liability or other requirements on the responsible
parties, but this right exists only if the state impositions are
210. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
211. Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted) (quoting Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383,
389-90 (1941)).
212. Pac. Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409,1422 (9th Cir. 1990)
("IT]he general rule on preemption in admiralty is that states may supplement
federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern, so long as state law
does not actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the uniform working of
the maritime legal system.").
213. In re the Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991).
214. Id. at 1515; see also Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455,
461 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) ("When admiralty law speaks to a question, state law cannot
override it. .. ."), vacated on other grounds, 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983).
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consistent with the applicable federal law.21 5 Imposing unlimited
strict liability for economic loss above the TAPAA limits would
directly conflict with a characteristic feature of the federal maritime
law: the Robins rule barring recovery for pure economic loss absent
physical or proprietary injury. Therefore, "Robins Dry Dock applies
to limit the damages recoverable under the Alaska Act in excess of
the $100 million recoverable under TAPAA.'2 6  Although not
mentioned by the court, the obvious conclusion to be drawn
regarding the Alaska Act's provision for recovery of pure economic
loss is that, for spills involving TAPS oil, it is substantively ineffec-
tive. Under $100 million, the Alaska Act provisions must be applied
consistently with TAPAA provisions. Over $100 million, the Alaska
Act is preempted by federal maritime law. Thus, the Alaska Act is
only useful in this class of cases as a vehicle for those plaintiffs who
seek a state forum.
VI. TE-m FUTURE OF OIL SPILL LIABILITY - THE OiL
POLLUTION Acr OF 1990
Following the Exxon Valdez spill, Congress sought to consoi-
date the liability provisions of the federal pollution statutes. While
the subsequent legislation affects only spills occurring after 1990,
and is thus irrelevant to the pending litigation, a discussion of that
statute is helpful in gauging the prospective effect of the Robins
doctrine on future oil spill disasters.
215. See Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515 ("Congress' power to legislate
concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for
their enforcement arises from the Constitution and is non-delegable.").
216. Id. The court further noted that while "Congress may have intended for the
states to be able to simply extend the strict liability provisions of TAPAA to higher
limits without subjecting those higher limits to Robins Dry Dock,... Congress did
not specifically do so, nor did it have the authority to grant the states permission
to do so." Id. (footnote omitted); contra Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp.
853, 864 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the state's compelling interest in regulating
pollution within its borders overrode the federal interest in uniformity; thus, a state
law providing for unlimited strict liability was not preempted by Robins); In re the
Glacier Bay, 7,16 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 (D. Alaska 1990) (TAPAA allows for the
recovery of pure economic loss, and, since the Act "clearly encouraged state
legislation regarding liability for ... oil spills... it would be inconsistent to impose
the Robins Dry Dock rule from maritime law on state claims when that rule does
not apply to TAPAA claims.").
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On August 18, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"),217 a new legal scheme governing
the discharge or threat of discharge of oil in navigable waters, on
adjoining shorelines, and within the exclusive economic zone218 of
the United States. Congress designed OPA both to prevent oil
spills and, in the case of spills that do occur, to provide quick
compensation to those injured, as well as to ensure safe and
comprehensive clean-up.219  OPA includes a comprehensive
liability scheme that provides for the recovery from responsible
parties of removal costs and other damages, including for injury or
destruction of natural resources, real or personal property, and lost
profits resulting from such injury or destruction.' 0 OPA specifi-
cally preserves the ability of states to impose even greater penalties
or more stringent standards than OPA itself provides,z' and
preexisting federal legislation, including TAPAA, remains in effect
except with respect to liability, which OPA now governs.' The
general effect of OPA is to "substantially alter] and increase[] the
pollution liabilities imposed on those engaged in the exploration,
production, and transportation of oil within the territorial seas and
the exclusive economic zone of the United States in the event of a
discharge of oil."''
217. 33 U.S.C.. §§ 2701-2761 (1990); see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
218. Under international law, a coastal state has the right to establish an
"exclusive economic zone" over which it has sovereignty for the purpose of
exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources up to 200
nautical miles from its coast. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 154 (1988) (footnote omitted).
219. The Honorable George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and Federal
Authority Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 237, 238 (1991).
Senator Mitchell, the majority leader of the United States Senate, was a former
federal district court judge and United States Attorney for the District of Maine.
He spearheaded the passage of this legislation. Id.
220. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b) (Supp. 1992).
221. Id. § 2718. "As most states now have unlimited liability statutes, the
[statutory] limits of... [OPAl are largely theoretical with respect to the actual
exposure to which a vessel owner may be subject." Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note
172, at 18.
222. Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 172, at 1.
223. Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted). "[T]he exclusive economic zone extends
seaward two-hundred miles from the coastline of the United States." Id. at 12 n.69.
1993]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
The OPA liability scheme imposes liability for removal
costs' and damages upon "each responsible party for a vessel or
facility' from which oil is discharged.'-' 6  Unlike TAPAA,
OPA specifically defines the types of damages for which recovery
may be had under the Act.' In particular, section 2702(b)(2)(E)
allows recovery for damages "equal to the loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss
of real property, personal property, or natural resources."'' This
section has been interpreted by one of its congressional sponsors as
allowing compensation to "people who have sustained economic
lossfl" and to those who have sustained "lost profits resulting from
such injury or destruction" of property or natural resources. 9 In
addition, not only are the liability limits significantly higher,' but
liability may be unlimited where a mishap is the result of gross
negligence or willful misconduct, or occurs in violation of an
applicable federal safety, construction or operating regulation."~
OPA, therefore, at least on its face, appears to enlarge the scope of
recoverable damages over that permitted under the Robins
doctrine, '' and has the virtue of at least attempting to define in
advance whether or not pure economic loss is recoverable.
Ambiguity remains, however, because although OPA "allows
recovery for lost profits or impairment of earning capacity, the
224. Removal costs "means the costs of removal that are incurred after a
discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial threat
of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from
such an incident." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(31) (Supp. 1992).
225. OPA excludes from its coverage any discharge from an onshore facility
subject to TAPAA. Id. § 2702(c)(3).
226. Id. § 2702.
227. Id § 2702(b)(2)(A)-(F).
228. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
229. Mitchell, supra note 219, at 238.
230. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (Supp. 1992). Although considerably higher, the new
limits remain much less than the two billion dollars reportedly spent by Exxon
following the Exxon Valdez spill. Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 172, at 16.
231. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (Supp. 1992). Liability may also be unlimited where
the responsible party does not report the incident or fails to cooperate or abide by
the orders of the officials concerned with removal activities. Id. § 2704(c)(2).
232. "[T]he statutory language clearly mandates a more generous standard for
recovery of economic loss than that recognized under prior statutes and case law."
Olsen, supra note 75, at 287.
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classes of claimants who may recover is unclear.' '1 3 Once again,
in attempting to deal with the issue of recovery of pure economic
loss, the statute and its legislative history fail to mention the Robins
rule, which remains the prevailing law in most federal circuits. The
conference committee report does little to clarify the issue, as the
only example it provides of the type of claimant who may recover
under subsection 2702(b)(2)(E) is that of commercial fishermen,
who have always been allowed recovery under the long-standing
Robins exception.2' Even Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell, a major proponent of OPA and a former federal district
court judge, in an article discussing the impact of OPA, omits any
mention of Robins or the dispute in the circuits regarding its
continued viability.35 In fact, while a final congressional statement
on the matter would be the best possible course of action, "Congress
has repeatedly contemplated, and rejected, a federal cause of
action" for the types of pure economic loss claimed in pollution
cases by shoreside businesses.23'
OPA's failure to directly address the Robins issue and its
impact on oil spill liability has lead to continued confusion as to
whether OPA and other pollution statutes are intended to overrule
or incorporate it. In the Cleveland Tankers case,' 7 the only case
yet to construe OPA's liability provisions, a federal district court
faced claims for economic loss arising out of a boat collision and
subsequent gasoline spill in the Saginaw River in Michigan. After
233. Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 172, at 15.
234. H.R. CoNF. REp. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781. The conference committee report states:
Subsection [2702(b)(2)(E)] provides that any claimant may recover for loss
of profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from injury to
property or natural resources. The claimant need not be the owner of the
damaged property or resources to recover for lost profits or income. For
example, a fisherman may recover lost income due to damaged fisheries
resources, even though the fisherman does not own those resources.
Id. However, "[t]his example is hardly illuminating, since even prior case law
allowed commercial fishermen to recover... [and] [w]hether commercial ventures
- for example, seafood wholesalers or tackle and bait shops, and the employees
of such commercial ventures - can recover remains unclear." Olsen, supra note
75, at 286-87.
235. See Mitchell, supra note 219.
236. Olsen, supra note 75, at 300.
237. In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
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endorsing the Robins rule, the court denied the plaintiffs' assertion
that their economic loss claims were cognizable under OPA." 8
The court held that although section 2702(b)(2)(E) allows damages
for "'loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the
injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or
natural resources,"' the claimants failed to "allege physical injury to
a proprietary interest" and hence fell outside the scope of OPA."9
Although the court did not assess how OPA affects Robins, the
court's strong endorsement of the bright-line approach to maritime
economic loss liability demonstrates that the issue is still open and
that OPA may not have solved it.
VII. CONCLUSION
The law is ambiguous about whether Alaska oil spill victims
may recover for pure economic loss. The most sound result,
however, is for courts addressing the issue to incorporate the Robins
physical injury rule into TAPAA's liability provisions. While
TAPAA does impose strict liability on defendants for "all damages"
arising from the spill of TAPS oil, Congress enacted this provision
against a backdrop of well-established maritime law prohibiting the
recovery of pure economic loss. In this context, then, the language
of the statute is unclear. Similarly, the legislative history falls to
clarify the intended scope of the "all damages" clause. Congress did
omit any mention of the Robins doctrine; this fact, in conjunction
with Congress's explicit denunciation of several statutory maritime
laws, suggests that Congress did not intend to upset Robins as the
prevailing standard for recovery. Thus, TAPAA should be read to
allow recovery, up to the $100 million limit of the Fund, for only
those damages which arise from an injury to person or property.
Interpreting TAPAA to incorporate the Robins rule would also
serve several underlying policy functions. First, it would ensure that
plaintiffs suing within the scope of the Fund were subject to the
same standard of recovery as those litigating outside the Fund.
This, in turn, would avoid the "race for the Fund" that would result
if those claiming against the Fund could recover pure economic loss
while others could not. Second, interpreting TAPAA to include a
238. See id. at 679.
239. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 1992)).
[Vol. 10:1
OIL SPILL RECOVERY
physical injury requirement avoids saddling defendants with
potentially limitless liability. By providing a "bright-line" beyond
which liability will be cut off, claims for pure economic loss may be
dismissed before beginning litigation, thus conserving valuable
judicial resources. In this era of mass torts, allowing Robins to
maintain its vitality provides a much-needed degree of certainty.
The ultimate problem in this situation is that Congress has
repeatedly failed to speak with a clear voice on the issue of pure
economic loss. Not only is its intent regarding the TAPAA
ambiguous, but at least one court has also determined that Robins
operates to cut off liability under the OPA. Such a rule demon-
strates that Congress, by avoiding the Robins issue, has only
confused the issue. Nevertheless, the fact that OPA does not itself
resolve the issue also supports an interpretation that allows Robins
and the TAPAA to operate in harmony - providing strict liability
for damages related only to physical or proprietary use.
David P Lewis
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